

Malla Reddy College Engineering (Autonomous)



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Department of Information Technology

II B. TECH II SEM (A.Y.2018-19)

Lecture Notes

On

80535 - Cloud Computing

Module III-cloud computing Architecture over VIstualities Data centers: Data Center Design and interconnection networks: > A data center is often built with a brige number of servers through or huge interconnection network. There are large-scale data centers and small modular data centers that can be housed in a A0-ft buck container. Vorre-house-State Data-conter Design;-Denni's Gannon chinis: "The cloud is built offer maysive data contais." The data contais are built economics of cale-meaning lower civit cost for larger data conters: Databarus it has 400,000 to Imilian serveris. cost to operate 400-server provider \$13/mbps; stroge to 402 7. Asmall date center could have 1,000 servers. The longer the data center, the lower the operational cost. Microsoft has 100 date antes, large or small almost glate. Data-Center construction Replanements;-Most data centers are built with commercially available components. An cobb-the-shelf Conver consists of a number of processor sockets, each with multicore CPU and the internal Cache hieraehy, local shared and cohoicast DRAM, and a number of directly alleched disk change. -> The DRAM and disk reprinces within the ane areasible -Howegh forst-level rock erte. and sustenes.

your accessible via a cluster level suit-on. Consider ? a data conter built with 2,000 servers, each with a data conter built with 2,000 servers, each with 80.8 Of DRAM and forwitte disk obives. Each group 80.8 Of DRAM and forwitte disk obives. Each group 01 40 servers is connected thought a 40 lops (not to 01 40 servers is connected thought a 40 lops (not to a rack-level switch that has an additional eight 4
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mixing hot-and hat any produced by cold air. The the servers concutates back to the interes of the incoming cookoust we act CRAC civite that cool stand then exhaust the cool ar into the raised floor plenum a Cesting callor 9 É Are burry ligetid with e. CAL ack نا الدي Floor to les Heer -7 tiploor slad A.S. Cystem in a rated floor detainner A cooleg Data Conten interconnection Maturates ---- Acitical care design of a data center is the in interconnection network among dester. data center the -7. This has design must meet fore special orefutioniente: 12 low betoney, high band welts, tow cost, message, passage interface (min) communi support, and fault toleraince. The design of nortico_ an inited-server nico moust sachsfy both point to print and economication patient among allernarias collective.

Specific design considerations one; 1> Application traffic support: - The New topology should support all most communication patence. Both pointto point and collective mps command och one must be supported. The network should have high bookids to meet this sepurement. grietwost Expansibilitys --The inter connection network chould be emplandable. -> with thousands or even truncheds of thousands of Some nodes, the cluster note interconnection should be realistications of the facing allowed to expand one more servers are added to the obta center -y Handwoore should be designed to "support lond balaneng and deta movement among the servers. -> None of the links should be down. Fault tolevoince and Craceful degradetion --> It should provide some inschanism to tolerate Aink or subtch failunes. -> fault tolerance at server is achieved by replacently darbei and competiling anning reductions servirs. +> Both hip and show should be handled or copie with network failures.) There should not critical paths why may become a single point of ballies pulls down the entire System.

Public cloud flatforme: CAE, AND AZURE SIC cloude and service offeringe. Rublic Cloud services are demanded by computing and ST administrators, software vendore and end users. Organization user's Individual users Application provider Sads Cloud platform provider pear cloud service provided Tage 1-1- (U.1-7 Handwone Calle one provide Browder were and thery Roles of individual and computizational interaction with cloud promideric under various cloud At the top level, millionderal users and organizational Service models. At the up very different services. The application wers domand very different server mainly initiatual. providens at the Most business organizations are serviced by The table service poorde compile, change and Jaas and Paal providere The initiation possibles to both applications and comparizational were. The cloud probannent is regardizational were on platform regunizer by paces or platform providence. defined

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-> Sensice level aggrements (2013) in network services, it is a fifthereacht the count for re com the Qoil Chargeteristics of network services. -> In a broder, Sense, the service lavel aggresser CELAS) for cloud computing address service awarlability, data integrity, privacy, and sewsity pooteition: Blank spaces in the table sefer unknown or underdeveloped features.

Cloople App Engine (GAE):-7 Google has the world's largest search engine faititres. > cloge has hundreade of data centers and has installed more them 460,000 service worldwinde. 7 Date stems are storied in lent, images, and vedio and once replicated to tolerrate faultion Jailures--7 google's Apptogine (GAE) offers a las platform supporting vorstores cloud and web applications. 1. Cloogle cloud Infrastructure: -) Woogle has promeaned development by loveraging the large number of data consters it operates For examples grast, google does, and google Eastly other appliestion are google proseed cloud Notable technology achievements of google include Google fels system (FE), Mapkedus, Bigtable, and In 2008, google announced the CINE webapplication In 2000 your is becoming a common philform phill is becoming a common philform for many small cloud sonotice produles. This specializes in supporting of scaleble (etastic) web applications platform

icens to our their application gnables CHAF ma large number of radri centure associated with engine operations. search Clongle 2 CHAE anther time; gthe resistent Schedular headby BARBER Servine Coope Maplance SicieTine 1000 JOD user Cohedylar 何平 Churt Sh slame. Hodie (Smelet cloge cloud platforms and major kirlding blocks -> Cit's is used to store large amounts of datar MapReducce is for use in application frograms we lopmit 7 chubby is used for distributed application Lock sentices. Bigtable offers a storage sensice-for accessing structured data. -7 Users can conteract with google application via the useb interface provided by each Tribut-posty application produces can use GAE to build cloud applications for providing souther The applications all sum to data linder the applications but and 7 tight management by google engineers.

configuration can oun to y Atypical cluster File system, Map Reduce Jobs, and Big Table Scovers for structures data. Fatra Scontices such can also sun distributed locks as chubby for CHE owns the user program on clongle's infrastructure And outside people cannot use the in the clusters. usingle forfreutruste de baild their own service. Ats fundamental sensitic programs is > Application developers de not need werry about the maintenance of service, As est is a platform third-posty programs. -> CIAF Supports python and Java programming 3. Functional Modules of CIAE The CIAE platform comprises the following major of the datastore offers object-orsented, distributed, as in and storage contras based on BigTable by the application runtime environment offers a platform the scalable web programming and evention It supports two development longuages Pottatos land Jula.

() the software development Kit(SDK) is used the Local application development. The SDK allows used to occute test runs of local applications and ciplication circle. d) The administraction console is used for easy minagement of user application development cycles, instead of for physical resource monogenerst es the CIAE web service infrasticuture prevides speisal interfaced to gurantee flexible use and management of storage and network resources Google offers exemptially free CIAE Services by GAE to all Conail autont owners. you can register for a CHE acutuit or we your email autrunt name to Signup for the sensice. The sensice is free within aquila. It you encode the quota, the page instructs you to how to pay for the Service. -> The platform doreinst provide any Ida's services, unlike Amazon, which offers taas and Paas. This allows developere to develop the applications. using programming longuages and the software trole supported by the provider. GAE applications ;-Welt-Known GAE applications, include the 7 roogle Scarch Engine, Google Docs, Clogh tristly, and cimail.

can support large numbere of These applications, applications are all own in the charge asens simultaneoully. -> the -> CIA+ Supports many useb applications. One is data centers. Storage service to store application - specific data in the jorgle infrastructure. CIAE also supports Google-specific services Scien as Genard account somice Cholich is a login -Service, that is, applieations can use the Gmail -> kirb applications built on top of UNE con we the APTIC authentificating users and sonding e-mail using google accounts.

-> Resource Management rund Minning - Fibbicience fi- (15) > One important challinge forred by providence of chard compiling services is the efficient management of untualized resource poole. Physical sesources such De CPU cover, dist space, and metust bandwidth must be Sliced and showed among while machines running potentially heterogeneous workladds. Data centers consumer large amounts of electricity According to a data published by HP, 100 server racks an consume 13 mill of power and another 1.3 min one oregonized by the colling enterno - to apprint application performance, dynamic resource management an also inprove utilization and consequently minimize energy consumption in date centers.

Buy a et al towe defined it at follows: "cloud Buy a et al towe defined it at follows: "cloud is a parallel and distributed computing system consider of a collection of interconnected and write swerts computere that are dynamically provisioned and present ed as one or more writed computing resources based on sensice-level aggreemente Gas established through negotlation between the sensice provider and communers."

> The National Institute of Standards and technology (NIST) characteristics cloud compiling as network access to a pay-per-use model for enabling available, convensent, on-demand network access to a shored pod of configurable compiling resources (eq. networks, sources, storge applications, services).

Anno ruet et al define cloud as the "deta center herdware and software that provide services."

7 21 addition to now compty and storage, cloud computing providers usually offer absord range of software services. They also include API-s and divelopment took that allow developers to build Samlarly Solable support on the services.
The cultimate goal is allowing cultoments to own the everyday IT infrastructure in the cloud?.
Holich a cloud should have common characteristica (1) pay per-usel no ongoing commitment, utility prices.
(1) pay per-usel no ongoing commitment, utility prices.
(11) Self-service interface.
(11) resources that are abstracted or vistualised.
A report from the University of cellifornia Besteling summors and the hey characteristice of cloud computing as infinite resources;
(12) the fillusion of infinite computing resources;
(2) the elimination of an up-font commitment by eloud sizers;
(3) the ability to pay for use a Directed.

Armbrust et al. propose definitions for public cloud as "cloud made available in a pay-as-you - go?" manner to the general public?" -randfrivate cloud al "internal data center of a business or other organization, not made notitut to - the paneral public? 7 This allows users to interact with the local data center while experiencing the came advantages of public doude, proleged access to virtual source, and per-usage metering and billing. -> A community cloud is "chorred by soveral organi - Lations and supports a specific community that -> A hybrid cloud its a combination of public and private clouds. It takes shape when a private cloud supplemented with compiling capacity from public doude. The approach of temperaety senting apparty to handle spikes in load is known as " doud - burstrig".

System models to Distributed and drived compating - of
-> Distributed and child rempitting systems are write contraining
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easily connect hundred of machines as a surger of
-> A WAN our connect many local sydem clusters to form a very
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build a massive system; while an assive system; while much s
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il dustere 2> P2P networks 3> computing grids >> Internet
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Computers 21000
clustered computers systems
demonstrated impressive secults in handling having
workloads with large date sets.

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1 De cystem as sert- un the second	2
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AVEAU EXT. D. C. E. C.
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An array of fame forces the heated air generated by the lever marks to go through a heat enchanger, which cools the air for the ment rack on a contrinut loop.

0 Container Data center construction,t The dota conter module is housed in a bruckcousable container. The midular container durigo includes the nive, computer, storage, and cooling geor. + one needs to increase colling elbiciency by vorying the water and antiflow with better conflow management. The construction of a container-based data center may start with one system (one server), then move to rack design, and finally to a syntainer system. Building arouts of 40 geners may take a half day. Enpanding this to a whole contain en cystem with maitigle raites for 1,000 Servers repurses the layout of the floor spale with power, networking, cooling and complete -I me container must be the disigned to be a weatherpriof and easy to transport. Interconnection of modular data anter: -> container based data contra modules dremant for construction of even bright data conters whig a firm of container modulate. of A server contric design of duta center module dweloped by quo, etcit. for insterconnecting modular deta enters. The servers one represented by circles, and switches 51 by rectangles, the Backe provider a largered structure

expercismpting. The Teralist. The an electric while power, a compting grid elipsieur. The an electric while power, a compting grid elipsieur. The grid is constanted anors while, while, or Internet bathories at a regional national, or global scale. The comptiers used in agrid include server, duites and Apercomptiers. Re, laptope, and mobile devices an be used to access agrid byton. 4. Internet cloude: The compting haben defined differently by many users and defined. The follows: "Actor is apost of onta compting has been defined differently by many users and defined. The follows: "Actor is apost of onta -tixed compting haben defined differently by many users and defined. The follows: "Actor is apost of onta -tixed compting haben defined action by bayer in dend compting has defined it follows: "Actor is apost of onta -tixed compting including batch-Style baits and jobs and interactive and user-found applications. -rousitionale can be deployed and caded out quicky -through action has enabled Cat effectiveness and server recourses has enabled Cat effectiveness and allowed cloud sitement to liverage too cold to benefict- both users and providers. Cloud cyters the enable able to mariter recourse usage in real time to liverage too cold to benefict- icher needed.	Contract Con
tij Teralind. This an electric white power, a computing grid offereau infrathruitine that couples compiters, software inside tevers people, and sensors together. The grid is construited aboves lower, where, or Internet backbones at a regional, national, or global scale. The compiters used in agrid include servers, duiter, and supercompiters. Res, laptops, and mobile devices an be used to access agrid system. 4. Internet clouds: The computer has been defined differently by many were and classifiere. For example, IBM, a major player in down computing that been defined differently by many were and classifiere. For example, IBM, a major player in down computing that been defined differently by many were and classifiere. For example, IBM, a major player in down computing that been defined differently by many were and classifiere. For example, IBM, a major player in down computing that defined it follows: "Actor is a post of ontow different workloade, including betch-style backend jobs and interactive and user-journg applications. Through acquid provisioning of vince. Witwalization of server accounces has enabled cost effectiveness and allowed cloud effers to isoerage low costs to benefit- both users and provisions. Cloud cyters chould be able to manitor resource though investion to inversible to inversible to be allowed when the cloud cyters chould be able to manitor resource.	expercompilling.
-> hite an electric while provers a way for our interview infratiruitive that couples compilers, address for the people, and sensors together. >> The good is constructed aboves house, or Interview backbornes at a regional, national, or global scale. >> The compilers used in agoid include soovers, duites, and supercompilers. Re, laptops, and mobile destres an be used to access agoid system. 4. Interview down agoid system. >> cloud compiling has been defined differently by many users and clearginers. For example IBM, a major player in dend compiling that defined it follows "Actors is aposle of ontow destres. A cloud campiling of destres. A cloud campiler of the backand jobs and include compiling the defined it follows "Actors is aposle of ontow defined a statements. -> workloads including batch-flys backand jobs and interviewe and user-fering applications. -> workloads can be deployed and called out quickly of some states and clearly a resources. A cloud call called out quickly by many the state of the source of the backand jobs and interviewe and user-fering applications. -> workloads can be deployed and called out quickly -brough resources has enabled call effectiveness and allowed cloud systems to laverage line calls to benefit- allowed cloud systems to laverage line calls to benefit- allowed cloud systems to laverage line calls to benefit- allowed cloud systems to laverage line calls to hone system of the destres. -> cloud cystems to laverage line calls to hone system of the destres. -> cloud cystems to laverage line calls to hone system of the destres.	the find
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-> cloud computing harbeen defined differently by manywers and derigners. For example, IBM, a major player in doud computing that defined it follows: "Actord is a post of onta -lixed computer resources. A cloud our host a variety of different workloade, including batch-style backend jobs and interactive and user-faring applications." -> workloade can be deployed and caded out quicky -brough rapid provisioning of VME. Vistualization of server resources has enabled cost effectiveness and allowed cloud egitems to leverage low costs to benefict- both users and providers. -> cloud cystems to leverage low costs to benefict- different worked that to leverage low costs to benefict- allowed cloud egitems to leverage low costs to benefict- -> doub cystems to leverage low costs to benefict-	4. Internet clouds-
-lixed computer resources. A cloud can hat a variety of different workloade, including betch-style backendjobs and interactive and user-formy applications. -7. workloade can be deployed and called out quicky -10000kloade can be deployed and calle of the there and server are and provided call effectiveness and both users and providers. - cloud cystems to laverage low costs to benefict- - doub cystems thank be able to monsitor resource usage is real time to enable rebalancing of allocatione	-> cloud computing has been defined differently by many users
-lixed computer resources. A cloud can hat a variety of different workloade, including betch-style backendjobs and interactive and user-formy applications. -7. workloade can be deployed and called out quicky -10000kloade can be deployed and calle of the there and server are and provided call effectiveness and both users and providers. - cloud cystems to laverage low costs to benefict- - doub cystems thank be able to monsitor resource usage is real time to enable rebalancing of allocatione	and designere. For example, IBM, a major player in doud
-lixed computer resources. A cloud and not a natural of different worklade, including batch-style backendjobs and interactive and user-facing applications. -> worklade can be deployed and called out quicky -> worklade can be enabled call effectiveness and allowed cloud egitems to leverage too calle to benefit- both users and providers. -> cloud cystems that enable able to monstor resource -> cloud cystems to enable rebalancing of allocatione wage in real time to enable rebalancing of allocatione	
different workloade, including prevous-give second points and interactive and user-facing applications. -7. workloade can be deployed and eaded out quickly -through rapid provisioning of vince. Virtualization of cenver are oused has enabled cost effective ness and allowed cloud egitems to laverage bio costs to benefict- both users and providers. 	tived months recourse A cloud an hat a renter of
-7. cloud cystems to laverage to monster resource -7. cloud cystems to laverage to monster resource both users and providers. -7. cloud cystems to enable able to monster resource -7. cloud cystems to enable rebalancing of allocatione	attferent workloade, including batch-style backend jobs.
-7. cloud cystems to laverage to monster resource -7. cloud cystems to laverage to monster resource both users and providers. -7. cloud cystems to enable able to monster resource -7. cloud cystems to enable rebalancing of allocatione	and interactive and user-forming applications.
-Imough rapid provisioning of VMC intualization of server areacused has enabled cost effectiveness and allowed cloud egiterns to liverage low costs to benefict- both users and providers. Doth users and providers. I cloud system chould be able to monsitor resource is allocatione is allocatione	millarde can be deployed and ecoled out quickly
server revoluced had criticated to be coste to beneficit- allowed cloud egiterns to laverage low coste to beneficit- both were and providers. A cloud system chould be able to monsitor resource allocatione to enable rebalancing of allocatione	i i i contexand of the vortigation of
allowed cloud equerns both were and providers. > cloud eystem chould be able to monsitor resource > cloud eystem to enable rebalancing of allocatione wage in real time to enable rebalancing of allocatione	server accounce has enabled cost effectiveness and
> cloud cystem chould be able to monsitor resource > cloud cystem to enable rebalancing of allocatione wage in real time to enable rebalancing of allocatione	alloved cloud legens
-> cloud cystems in enable rebalancing of allocatione	both were and provident ality to monitor resource
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	<u>Alfred vertigeneer to the transfer</u> of the second of the

-> cloud compiling applies a untralised phillion with elastic presources on demand by poorsitioning hordware, safture, and datasete dynamically. -> Destitop computing is moved to a service - oriented platform server dusteric and huge databased at databases. using

Data Conter Management Delicus The Basic repurements for monaging the resources of a data conter are. making a common users happy: The dute conter should be provide quality service controlled information flow; - Information flow should be straining custained sensical and high availabily are the pointing goals. Multiuser manageability - The systems must be managed to support all functions of a data center, including traffic flow, detabase updetrig and server maintaname. Salability to prepare for deterbase growth; - The storage, processing 210, power and cooling subsystems should be available. Reliability is unimationed infrastructure - Facilover, fault tologo ice, and up we migration should be integrated to enable accoracy of critical applications from failures or disaters. Low cost to both users and providens .- The cost to users and providence of the doud system build over the dota conters should be reduced, including all operationed cottin Sensity enforcement and deta protection: Data Privacy and searchy defence mechanisms must be deployed to protect the data writer against new altacks and system interrupts data integrity from his attents. to maintain green intermation technology: source power consumption and upgrading energy effectionly are in high dimand when desirgoing and operatory current and future data conters.

Level I 1,05 <1,1> $|X_{h}|$ 11,2) Level Ö 10,37 <0,0> 100000 @)@)@) 02 Beilde, aligh priformance: server contric network for building madular detalenter. -TTHE books layer contains all the server nodes and they form Level 0. Level 1 switches torm the top layer of Barbeo. Barb is a rewsively constructuited Structure. The Barbe provides multiple pathe between any two nodis. 2 Inter- Module connection Hetwolds :--> wu, etat have proposed a network topology for intercontance connection using the agrovementioned Back network of building provers. Burb is commonly used inside a server container. The proposed metwork was named > mid cub (for modularized Datacenter cube). This network connects multiple Baube containens by Using hughspeed scienteres in the Bube.

> In fact, mainformer had to operate at very high utilization because they were very supervive and costs should be justified by ellident image. rates -> The mainframe and collapsed, with the advent of fact and insupervive microprocessore and It dated centers moved at commadity servers. to collections SOA, web services, web 2.0, and Madnips "--> The emergence of web services (WS) open standarde has sprificantly contributed to advances in the domain of ship integration. We standards have, been created on top of ensisting ubiquitous technologies such as this and the thus promiding common mechanism for delivering sentra making them deal for implementing a centre control - The purpose of a cost is to addres requirements of lockely coupled, standards based, and protocol-independent distributed computing to a SOA, saftware resources are packaged as econories", which are coel detined, selfcontained modules-that provide clendand business functionality and are independent of the state or contract The concept of guing sensices initially foculed on of other services. the enterporse web, but goined spare instructions realm as well, expensively with the advient of web 2.0

cloud compating:-Roote o-[We can track the most of clouds compaling by drawing. the advancement of several technologies, especially in handware (virtualization, multi-core chips), Internet technologies (Web services, service-oriented anchitectures, web 2.0), distributed computing (clusters, gride), and systems management (cudo -nomic computing, data center automotion). Hondware Handesarte Vivenalization Dichtoctus computery MULH-COR aspe outstya good CON 1000 Compating Cloud files services not Technologies computing mashups Autonomic Computing Data Center Adornaly cystems mousgement Convegence of vorsione advance leading to the -liq: cloud compiling. advert of From mainframes to cloude offered common data processing In 1970s, companies who tastil, such as payroll automation, operated timeshared mainframes as utilities, which could serve divers of applications and offen operated close to in

Architeettinal design of computer and strage cloudy A-generic cloud to exiteduc dation:--> An interviet cloud is chattimed as a public dustri of servers provisioned on demand to perform collective in web sorvices or distributed applications using deter center resources. <u>cloud pletform design goals</u> - scelability, on tustization, efficiency, and reliability are four major deligers goals of a cloud computing phitform. -> cloud normagement receives the user request, finde the connect resources, and then calls the provinting. services which invoke the nesources in the dord. -> System scalebility can befinit from cluster achitectu it one service takes a lot of power, storage coparety, or network traffic, it is simple to add more Sentens and bondustaltb. -> Systing reliability can benefit from this orchitectur. data can be pit into multiple locatione. For example: user e-mail on be put in the disks which expond to different geographically separate data conters. ff one of the differ center graphes, user detrine Still accessible, the reale of cloud antitette

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Reserved to	can be indexed by adding more servers. ()
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	lade are enabled by polaces
	clud Enabling Technologies
	Jerbodogy Requirements and Benefits
	Technology Kequinert Lens the ble daployment
1	Fast pletform - fast, ebficient, and flexible daployment
	tast pletform - tast, ebbrecent, deployment of cloud resources to provide dynamic computing enononiment to
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	Virtual clusters _ virtualized cluster of vinc provisioned to extrictly
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	Autitement - Saos for distributing software to alonge number Hultitement - Saos for distributing software to alonge number
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2	
5	web-scale support for e-commence, distance colucation, communication - Support for e-commence, distance colucation, social networking, digital entertainment
×.	Distributed storage - honge sale storage of personal neutrale and
	public archive infrimation which and
	distributed storage and the ductas.
	wenning and - beense management and brilling sentres
	berling and - ticense management and brilling sources is berling services which greatly benefit all types of cloud services in utility computing.
	sear as in utility essenting.

ALA ALA

-> In the consumer useb, information and senses may be programmatically appregrated, acting as building complete compositions; called scottle martypis blocke of complete compositions, caution & Sol chand confuting Turnelagiv = Ovistualition & Sol 6 UNALLY COMPLETE Gold compilling. A chid compiling attables apprequetton of distributed riesonnes and braniparently access to them. Mast production gride such as Mena Grid and FGEE Seak to share compute and stringe relatives distributed across different administrative domains usith liber main focus being speeding up a broad ectivity fic applications, such as climate range of modeling, daug design, and protein analysis. A Key aspent of the good vision realization has useb services -based protocols been building standarrol -that allow distributed resources to be rediscovered, accessed, allocated, monitoried, decounted for, and posted tor, etcu and is general managed as a single intra system . The open chrid constant Architerutures (0954) addresses this need for glandordization by distance a set of core apabrilitree and behavious that address flay concerns in grid systems. Oblity Competing___

In whity computing environments, users assign a "whitily" value to their jobs, where whility is a forked or time - varying valuation that captures various (1) Pas contraints (deadline, importance, satisfactions). - The valuation is the amount they are willing to pay a service provider to satisfy their demands The service providers then attempt to more inize they own whilely, where said whilely may directly own whilely, where said whilely may directly own whilely, where said whilely may directly own while their profit provider can choose to prioritize high yield (inen profit per writt of area used) prioritize high yield (inen profit per writt of area used) where jobs, leading to a containe where compete for all where as a market place, where we compete for her jobs.

Hondusarie unitualization -

+ cloud computing servorces are circultus bacted by brigescale deteranterie composed of thousands of computers scale deteranterie composed of thousands of computers. Such data content one bast to serve many users. Such data content one bast to serve many users. and host many disparate applications for this purpose, hordware instruction can be considered purpose, hordware instruction can be considered as a porfect fit to overcome most operational serves of data conter bailding and maintenance.

I Hondware onstalization allows orunning maltiple operating systems and loftware starts on a single physical platform. A software bayer, the ornhall machine monitor (mm) also celled a hypensisor, mediates access to the physical hardware proceeding to each gruest operating systems a

Virtual machine (VM), which is a set Oh smill platform interfaces. serveral "mnouthe technologies" -> The advent of multiple chips, para britualization, hardwane assisted vortualization, and live migration Othvoir - has contributed to an insoluting adaption of unavailated on on server cysterns. Vm2 تنبع عبن User 5[10 Emeil server ص لک T-F-Lobook MP APPA APPX Rabyon instr Server Dita APPY APPB Java base-Cinest Or windows Loniers Virtual machine monitor (Hyponson) Handworse A hile instituciali xagid conter. [Eusois] [Equators] A we not An water (Party) Autonomic compituy; DUND Sem he + The increasing completely of comped Buch research on autonomic computing notivated seeks to improve systems by dellaring human iprolivement in their operations. In other words; systems should manage themselves, withhighlevel quidance from hamans. of Autonomic, or self managong, systems riely on monitoring probes and gauges (sensors) on an adapting engrine (automorni & monoger) for compiling optimi xations based on monitoring dates, and on

effectors to consult changes on the system, (3) Actorismic computing triliative has contribut T IBH 'S define the four properties of autonomic - ed to systems: self configuration, self-optimization, self heating, and self-protection. C - Forthal grig Sequice ale provided to dot a chaption SOA > (\mathbf{i}) Algoly internet Adv = Sidvice Reusability, Easy maintenance, platform independent, Reliability, Scaldle es vigne Service provides SUNIU (answer Saula Leg Vistualization: Allow to shale single physical appenlation [st Soula viona Fulliple es) FNS tar ce فناجتان uses. JUL ' USU ן V פן יי instude Englassing 225 + US Physical Lejoulle Stalege, N/W, Selver Str المعاشقهم ا Multiterent Alititerent I Grid Conputing = Distlibuted computing in which a glory of conjutions flux hultiple localities are converted with ladjother JII. Computer Risculces can be heterogeneous v can be leated enzywher, (ED -) At least one computer in a group watter a sinney Aloun tude B USU -> Specier gred comprose Stars with Diritity (asputy savy a pay pu use tooked is fejoutic de al Que With Vital Wetch Utel

(1)) A Generic cloud architecture."i the internet cloud is envisioned as a massive cluster of servers. - these servers are provisioned on demained to perform collective web services or distributed applications usig data-center resources. servers in cloud combe physical mailines or VM mailing user interfaces are applied to acquest service and provisioning tool carries out the cloud systems to deliver the sequented sensite. -> the septrative infrationation of cloud most handle all resource management and de most of maintenance Det - conter ? automoticely. cloud pletomiprovisioning of virtual compates storage and noo reconner plus elevand duba sets from multiple dota sets pours mentiple detrucolers to only the demander of multitenent appretime reputation spiera neputation spiera and data colation peronie provisional vituelization, management, and weardedaics と見ていたが for protecting Clevel Sewilly and philinance A Service cotalogis (cleents) ഫന് പ്രതിന A secondly accore cloud platform built with a cristical cluster of my strage, and networking resources over the detacenter semior operated by providers. Sainty becomes a critical issue is subguilding the operation of all cloud types. The cloud physical photoms biolder is more concerned about the performance / poile hatio and reliability resule than shear speed performance $-\gamma$

cloud Architentimal Development_ 12 Layered. architecture of a cloud is developed at thee The buyers: infrastructure, platform, and application, as + These three development layers one implemented with vistalization and standardization of bardware software and recounces poortsioned in-the cloud. The internet public close Were miteral Highind cloude 2 provoite Over Internet and Cover noternet provisioning of both physical and virtualized cloud rescurrent Application by e (lass) Pletform layer (Par S) Infrastructure layer (Iaas, Heas, Draspeter)

haipered orchitectural development of the cloud plutform) fir Jacs, Paas, and Sais applications over the Internet. 7 The sonice to public, private, and hybrid clouds one anveyed to users through neurophy support over the Internet and intranels involved. 9 It is clear that infrastruiture layer deployed first to support Acas services. It is to e foundation for building to support Acas services. It is to e foundation for building the platform layer a fundation for implementingthe application layer to scal applications.

-> In away, the visitualized cloud pletform serves as a "system middleurane" between the infrastructure and application layers of the cloud. The application layer is formed with a collection of all needed software modules for saal application - This layer provides the services like rRM; Ersail, financial transactions, capply chairs monogenerits Mosket olanted cloud Architectore --> As consumers arely on cloud providers to meet more of their computing needs, they will require Heir specific level of QOS to be maintained by providers, in order to meet their objectives and ender their operations. 7 Monket oriented relource roomagement is necessary demand of claud service and to regulate the supply maket frequilibrium t Between supply to achieve. Carolie request examiner and derhand - customer direr Condenson manifement Accurating pricing censil Nquest VM monto D'sparcher cloud anchiteitine narket mented Same al

+The pricing mechanism devices how service requerty one charged. For instance, sepwerts can be charged based on subsmission time (peaks/off-peaks), porcing rates (freed changing), or availability of resources Caupply (demand). Quality of Sensice factors i-A deta center comparties of multiple computing sensers that provide regound to meet service demainds. + In the assayactored a connexcial offering to enable coveral burniess operations of companies, there are out all gos parameters to consider in a sensitie request, such as time, cost, all ability and trust Serinty. -> Gos repunctionists cannot be stattle and may charge over time due to continuing changes in but mell operation and operating entronments: -> The should be greater important on citaries. -> Since they pay to alless senter in cloud. -> So the quality of sensice is must reputed in doudsonices.

Ø and Types of clouds hayers + cloud compiling services are divided into three classes, according to the abstraction level of the capability provided and the service model of_ 20 - PT-U-94 - 75 Sas. Appricer Providers, (1) Infractive as a service pute (2) platform as a veroica Server (8) soffware de a service studiége Networky . کې ښونۍ male for Main Access & Centre conside. ます。 Management dagg content Well Beach Web State Claud Applications $2, q_0 >$ Desussion of social new, office anter, Soal CRA, Video processing . Act الأج المجمعة المحمد dr 6 chud 1 doud platform 过效于 ∋ € te d цЦ Development Programming buguages Fromonment. paasfrancioste, marling editore, structured date Withal Infrastructure ! F. cloud Infrastructure compte semers, Date and the Second Storage Frewall, Lond Balancer the cloud computing starts : $\mathbf{h} \mathbf{\hat{e}}$ في في في

These abstraction levels any be otheo Stop call de layered orrditeetune where services of higher composed for sources of the underlying own be los por succession Infractionature as a service: -> Offering Unitualized resources (computation, strings) and communication) on demand is known as Infrastruiture as a Service (Iaas). -> It enables on demand provisioning of cenvers scurping serveral choices of operating systems. and a customized software stady. -> Infratstrutting sensies are considered to be the bottom bayer of cloud computing systems. $\hat{\mathcal{L}}_{i} = \hat{\mathcal{L}}_{i} + \hat{\mathcal{L}}_{i} +$ Amation web services mainly offers Task, which in case of the FCL service means offering vints with a cofficience starts that an be customized similari to bow an ordinary, physical server. would be outomized > Users are given providegée to perform numerous actustice to the sonier, such as: starting and stopping it , withomizing the by installing software packages, and attacting winted drete to the e de la compañía de l 揿

Nr.

NO' platform, as a service: + Another approach is its offer a higher level abstraction to a matter cloud easily promonble known as platform as a contice (Paas). A cloud pletform offere an environment on which developers create and deploy applications and do not necessarily need to know how many processors or how mails memory that applications will be using will be using. addition, multiple programming models and specialized services (egy data actives, autisentices, and payments) are affered as building blocks to nes applications. . R -> google App Figne, an example of patform as a Sensice, offers a salable environment for developing and hostig web appliestions; ishich should be written in a specific programming languages sub al pythion in sound, low it $\left[\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \frac{1}{2} \sum_{$ sofficiane as a sense. Applications, reside on the top of the cloud cheets Stack Services provided by terms bufer can be accessed by end users through web portals.

> Therefore, consumers are hornerisingly shifting the losely installed computer programs to on-time. software solution that affer the functional an and the we Care Providence + Traditional desistop applications, such as wind processing , and greatenest can now be accured as a sense (p. the web) $x_{2} = x_{2} = x_{2}$ 11 33670 applications tention This model of delivering See & Star a service (loge). as equipance as Alexan radi Mila Siles force, corry, which wellies on the shar modely applications CIROD podentristy a offers bunness. to at needer, completely on their sensers, allowing unitomers to customize and access applications and demand demand. Deployment model 4 -classified be public, prints contrarity, en hybrid, based on model of deployments A gloud + Type of clouds based or Nit in privade/ Sterprise) pullonial instead Public Anternet cloud 2 clouds cloud (miced usign of) and estatin a company prover and putter 3rd policy claid information douds white about own Dels center/integrit outer for internal and for patricises Sensitives when plaute 旅游 (ALTICAL)

Copid ve cloud Grid compiting is a network based compitational model that the the ability to process large volumes of data with the help of a goodp of networked computers that coordinate to solve a Problem together. cloud compitting Gridcompiting ÷ St is for Scorice Oriente It is for Application Griented -> The computing resources > The resources one distributed one managed centrally among different computing and aseptered over uniti for pocasing a single test. multiple servers in clustis -> Goods one generally oroned > The cloud servers are and managed by an organization owned by infrastructure providence and ase placed within it Premises. is physically dispose te wettons. within a corporate -> It an also be accessed -> sit operates network. through the tatemet > Aprovides ashared pool of -> It involves dealing with computing resources on an accredied a common problem basi s along variging norsberg of computer resources 7 Its a collection of interconnected computers and networks that can be -> more than one computer called for boge-scale processing taste. the problem together. coordinated to oresolut

1-> While grid computing involves virtualizing computing involves virtualizing computing involves virtualizing computing involves virtualizing computing compating computing is where an application, doesn't deuse relauses directly, rather it accesses them through a sense over the interact. -> In good computing, necources are distributed over grais, whereas is cloud compiling, resources are managed centrally. y The term " cloud " negers to the internet in cloud compiling and as a volide of means internet - based computing. The cloud manages data, scully, requirements, job quierres, etc. by eloninating the needs and complexity of buying hardware and coffworre needed to build. applications which are to be delivered as a societ overthe doud. Opid computing is mostly used by academic research and is able to handle longe sets of ₽Ì. limited duration jobs that involve huge volumes. .01 data

G Architectural Design Challinger -> challengel: Service Availabily and Data Lock-in problem -> The management of orcloud conside by a single company. is often the earse of single points of feature. To achieve (14th avoilebrility) ++A, one can consider using multiple cloud providents. Therefore, using mettiple aloud providents may Provide more protection from failures. > In addition to mitigating data lock-in concerns, chandandization of APIs enables a new usage model in voluite the came software infrastrution and be used in both public and private clouds. challings: Data privacy and seasily concerns: 7 current cloud offerings are essentially public (nother than private) networks, subarry the system to more attacts. + For example, you could enaught your data before placing it is a doud. -> In a cloud enorronment, a newer attacks may result form hypenvisor maturine, gewest hopping and hipaiting, so-the centry to the deter is the main concern 5 First of Congestion and Bottleneetes . wone load 1 OCTURI 1Star challing 3; - Unpred l'estable performance - Multiple Vine conshare OPUs and main murrary intra-14 problementic praises Shedre in cloud computing, but Ilo showing is -> Internet applications continue to become more dete- intensive. parallel tanjus ?

cloud users and providens have to -think about the implications of placement and trablic at every level of the system, of they wants to minimize coste -> This Kind of reasoning can be seen in Amazon's development of the new cloud First service. Therefore, data transfer bottleneuts must be removed, bottleneut lints mut be widered, and weits servers should be semaned. challenger: Distributed Storage and widespread software Bugs ;is always growing is cloud 7 The database applications, the opportunity is to create astrage system that will not only meet the growth, but also combine it with the clied - advantage of soling astatrailing upand during on demand. durigin of efficient distributed -> Thes demands Strage are retworks. -> harge-sale distributed bugs cannot be reproduced so the debugging must occur at a calle is the production data centrals. challinget - cloud salability, Interoperability, and Applein on one phalipun Standardizettion; the able to incorposite Mator -> The pull-as-yourgo model applies to change and networks bandwith; botharro counted in terms of teleminated of bytas used. GAE automatically scales in response to load marshes and decleases; uses are chared by the cycles used

> Acox charges by the hour for the number of Von indenses used, even If the machine is fidle. - Open unitalisation format (OVF) durites an open, couse, postable, efficient, and eutennible formatifor the packaging and distribution of vorse. -> It also defines aformat for distributing safeware to be deployed in vins. -> Internet of cloud standardization, the ability for vistual appliances to own on any united philipping. we also need to enable vos to run on heterogeneous handware platform hypoturiors. Challenge 6; - Software licensing and Reputation Sharing: -> Many cloud computing providers originally selfed on open source software because the tranking model for commercial estimate is not ideal for utility computing. one can consider using both pay-for-use and bulk - use licensing schemes to widen the business connerge. -> one wetomer's bad behaviorer and effect the reputation of the entire cloud, must be colled by the SIA (source This problem level agrienent) level.

Certain features of a cloud and essential to enable sential -Hat trucky represent the cloud computing model and satisfy expectations of consumers, and cloud afterings must be (1) set sensice (ii) per wage-metered and billed. (iii) elastic (1) automizable. consumers of cloud computing services expect on demand, nearly instant access to resource. To support this expectation, clouds must allow (1) self <u>cenvice</u> self-sensice access to that customers can repliest, customize, pay and use services without intervention of human operators. is per-ocoge metering and Billing Servicel must be priced on chart-term basis (eq. by the hours), allowing users to release (and not pay for) resources as soon as they are not needed for these reasons, clouds must features to allow effectent trading of centre and as pointing accounting, and brilling.

-> retening should be done arrundingly for different types of service (eg. storage, processing, and bundwith). and usage promptly reported, Thus providing greater transpanency (11) Flasticity -> cloud computing gives the illusion of infite recourses available on demand. -> Therefore users can supert closeds to rapidly provide computing repurces in any quartity of any time. -7 Resources rested from the cloud mast \rightarrow highly customizable. -> In the case of infrastructures sources, customized means allowing users to deploy specialized visitual appliances and to be given privileged (resot) access to the unitual servers. Other sensice classes (Paas and Saas) offer less felenability and one not suitable for -7 consputing, but still one expected general - purpose provide a contain level of automization. -00

Basic principles of cloud computing i
2 cost/benefit: Frailudie -1be benefite of cloud bused
on full understanding of the platform business with the costs of other technology platform business
2. Frust: Make trust an essential part of cloud.
2. Frust: Make trust an example solutions; building trust into all business process that depend on cloud compiting. that depend on cloud compiting.
that depend on any is the full event of capabilities, 3. capability: Integrate the full event of capabilities, that cloud providers offer with internal recourses to provide a comprehensive technical support and defrong
that cloud providers offer will interipert and defining
colution.
solution. 4. Enterprise rish: Take on enterprise orists management perspective to manage the adaption and use of cloud.
5. Accountability: Manage accountabilities by clearly
defining internal and provider responsibilities.
cloud computing is different from your baditional
coeb sensice because of the primerples behind cloud computing these principles are:
Resource pooling: cloud computing providers homers longe economies of sale through resource pooling. They
put together avait network of servers and hard
draives and apply the same-set of configurations,

創業

protection and the works for them. Virtualization: Users do not have to care about the Physical dates of their handware nor worry about hardware campatibility. Flasticity: Addition of more hondidict space or center can be done with a few clicks of the onbandwidth Geographical icalability is also available demand. in cloud computing one can choose to replicate data to several data contene around the world. Actomatic/easy resource deployment: - The user only needs to choose the types and perifications of the resources he require and the cloud computing provider will - Configure and set them up automatically. Metered billing: Users are charged for only what they use. -> These principles allow cloud computing to bring more cost-savings, automation and flautisity to the users, compared to using a traditional useblessive provider.

challenges and <u>Rishs</u> Ð Despile the initial success and popularity of the cloud compiting porcidigm and evidencive availability of providers and tools, a significant number of challenges and mistris are inherent to this new model of computing. - Acuidence, developens, and end users must consider these challenges and mistis to take good advantage of claud compiteig. - Issues to be faced include user privacy, data scinity, data-lock-in, availability of service, disaster recovery, performance, scalability, energy-efficiency, and programmats -tity 1. Savisty, Privacy and Trust: -> Ambruit et al cité information seurity au amain issue: "current cloud offerings are essentially public. enposing the astern to more attentis." For this reason there are potentially additional challenges to make cloud computing environmente ave courre as is house IT systems. -> senty and privacy affect the entire cloud computy. stack, since there is a maissive use of third-pointy Sensices and Infrastrucies that are used to host in postant data on to perform critical orperatione or In this summer to, the trust toward providers is fundamental to ensure the desired level of privary for

applications bated in the cloud.
a Data Look-To and Standards eather
> A major concern of cloud compiting users is about the
> A major concern of cloud compiting users is about the baining their data locked-in by a curtain provider.
+ users may want to move date and applications
inters may want to move data and applications out from a provider their does not meet their repuirement
- Itali suitan a suitan
-> However, in their current form, doud control methods
-dures and pattorns do not T
-de - de - de computing infacture - de contentations de not employ standard metordes - deres and patiforme de not employ standard metordes - de storing and user data and applications. - of storing and user data and applications.
-> Conseptiontly, they do not
are not portent to changed digestion Jok
one not portable The answer to -kie concern is standardization to the The answer to -kie concern is standardization to the two direction, there are efforts to bacete open devided; this direction, there are efforts to bacete open devided;
for clores and U
3. Availability, fault-rolerance, and Disaster Recovery'-
In this charge could have
about the service level to be provided once their application
and more to the could.
-> The expectational include availability of the same
-7 The expectations
its overall performance, and what measures on
to be taken when considering goes woorg in the system
or the components.

Resource Management and Energy - Elbiciency - @ One important challinge faced by provident of cloud compilling services is the efficient management of unhalized resource pools. Physical sesources such dis. CPU coner, dist pare, and network bandwidth must be sliced and showed among untrol machines running potentially heterogeneous workloads. Data certere consumer large amounte of électricity. According to a data published by HP, 100 center racks can consume 13 mill of power and another BMW one required by the colling ligton ~~ to apprinte application performance, dynamic also inprove utilization resource management Gn and consequently minimize energy consumption in data centers

Service models R -> cloud computing based on Service model. dategorice of consider model. The Sonisice modele one categorized listo liste barely. models: software as a side (Soas) ß. pletform as a service (Paal). æ Infrastructure - al- a-cerisce (Iace) 3 cloud elient Web browsen, mcB app,cte Soas Appli ation CRM, office cuit, Email, games Applicitions, Developing pletform ent, Deployment tail Infrastructure Applications, Development Digloryment toxie * Lewice models in cloud computing 1> Cofficience as a Cenvice (Caac) Saas is known as 'on-demand software, It is a software distribution model. In - bis model, - the applications are hosted by a cloud somic provider 27 publicized to the internet. Over internet and Associated data and coffware one houted controlly on aloud eever in loal. 1.5

ther can alless had by using a useb booriser all Fix: CRM, Office Suil, Fimail, gomes etc. one the softwome applications. -> The companies leke Google, Microsoft provide their applications as a service to the end users. -> Saas is easy to buy because the pricing of Saal is based on montby or annual fee and stallows the Organizations to access business functionalities at a small cost, which is less than bransed applications. -> Caas needed less handware, because the cofficience is hosted remotely, hence organizations. do not need to investig in additional hondevare. Less maintenence cost is required for saas and and require special cofficience or homework werklone. Disadvantages of Saas;-Save applications are totally dependent on Internet connection. They are not usable without Internet chifficult to switch amongst the Cool vendors. അറപ്പെ ത. 11-28 2> platform- as- a-Service (fairs) -> Paas is a programming pletform for developence. This pletform is generated for the programminers to run and manage-the -pplicetions Oreate, test,

can easily usite applications and deplet - A developer At directly into Bas layer. suntime environment for application -> Road gives the development and deployment tode. Gogle App Fingine (GAF), windows Adame, Selectore. com are the Framples of Paas. Advantages of Paal:--> Paos is easier to develop. Developer can concentrate on the development and innovation without wronging about the infrastructure. 7 In Paat, developer only requires all and an Internet connetion to start building appricitions. Disaduantages of Paal:-- one developer can write the applications aspertie plutform provided by Raal vender hence the moving the application to another Paals vendor is a problem. 3> Infractrueture -as- a-Service (Ical) is a way to deliver a cloud computing infraits -dure 19the server, storage, network and operating stam. The customer's can access these resources over cloud compiling platform her Internet as an on demand service. 7 In Iaal, you bull complete resources rather than server; coffuerie, deta anter space or network punchasing equipment

Advantages of Jaac: 20 -7 In Jaal; user can dynamically choose a CPU, memory storage configuration according to need Users can easily access the voit computing power an Jaal Cloud -7 avoilable Disadvaritages of Iaas:platform model is dependent on -> Taas cloud computing Virtualization and of Internet aunitability

Implementation levely 00 Withulization: (<u>1</u>) Virtualization is a computer architecture technology by which mattiple 'initial mainines (vinie) are multiplened is the same handware machine. Tithe idea of Ving can be dated back to the 1760s. - the puppose of a vin le to, enhance mesource channy by many wears and improve computer payormance interms of resonance utilization and application flambility. A to MA > Hardware oreconnes CCPU, memory, I/O deor areat.). En cothoone resources copenating sisters and regiters ubrance) can be untualized in veryous functional And Any parami toipors. -> After virtualization, different user, applications managed by their own operating systems (quest 05) can own ton the same hondware, independent of the host of. - This is offers) done by adding additional software, called a untualization layer. \$1.1.1 · · · · · -> This Visituatization, layer is thorowin as hypervisor or unitial mathine monitor (VMM). In Vone the applications have with they own E-Oa guist as over the uncludized, CPU, memory, and 210 resources. 1 W.

The main function of the cost come laugh for 3 Vistualisation is to Unitualise the physical bondurance of about moutine into unbud mesources to be used by the VMx. -> This caro be implemented at vonious operational levels, the ortualisection collusione creeks the abstraction of me by totorpoing a metulization layer at vorious write of a compter cyclin ... untualization layers indude The common is Instructions cet andresedure (ICA) livel. 2> Hondurane level sty operating system terrel. 43 (throng support bakely some starts product 52 application level 12 , on the tag 21 10-12 water forming and the $f_{2}^{(2),\pm}$ Protect 1 1 山影 N. MAG Applications Worthal san on user Host of Barg Gardionie 1. Handrears warong the The address property to be me indussedure of compter system it before and after the altration in the set of a S 24

-> On Computer planing Android - blue Stack Emulator > Running another O.S on only one M/C Dowindow's Running Usendy. - on 1 Mc hunning 2-3 6.8 Punning -> Vistualization is abstraction of Computer Reconces -> Cacation of Visituale Resubised Saves 1ºKc NIW Ask + Haldolisk diving partitization not doing - cut + Benifit =) (I) Co-Exestance of OS on Same M/C Vistual M/C Ubather Tale Konny on visiting type. - Code if Hullisrous. if we the @ Protection ale Running My Main M/c. then it it become Aublen S/n II get clogh. So we leas Run like that Cose on Welthale M/c. - going to Regh as that vittual as only rety Plat on your Real Mr.

-) on computer June 3 Application level Android - bluestar JVM NETUR (Sprace y Cuger-Level ATT) Level WENELVCUDA Operating system level . 노랑자 31년0 YEAD OF LOOD $^{\circ}$ (1) 6.35 Hondwarie ababianti on laupritians. S wall WTWOME ! wirtualpc. $\Delta dy_{\sigma} \in g$ $\approx 1 \times$ Instruction of dichitative (201) 27 (336.) U) level BERD S.L. Oak Con Bar ed little and the olineto a distraction ranging from blo to applications infine Qepo. rates ast 1/2 Instruction set Anchitecture level Frony machine has an instruction set. This instruction find handwares v -7 set is an interface between software. comman late Using this instruction set software 1973 Crapp. Garph & with the handwhere so when virtualization consteal at this relieved we can create an emuletor the emulater rectares all the instructions from the instructions to the same to of the high and through these instructions to the instruction of those hastmachine. 신가 여러 도전는 Secondary 1 . Although the second s 8. J.

as Handware Level :-Æ. 7 Handware level virtualization is performed mghton top of the hadwane. -> On the one hand, this approach, generates a virtual havdware environment for arm. -> on the other hand, this approach generalises a visitual hardware environment for avm. -7 On the other band, the process manages, a the underlying hondustrie through instralization: -7 the idea is to untualized a compilet's releases, that as its processors, memory, and \$10, deutres, -> The intention is to upgrade the nondurine utilization 7 The intention was implandented provide the ten into 1570. In rate by multiple where concurrently. 7 The idea was implandented provide sources that allow multiple 14be 1960c. More recently, the ten hyperoteor has been source applied to orthalize the based machines to real lines. or other quest as applications intel in the wind in the 3> Operating System level --bodition or એઝે પૈકાર, ફર્મ્સ્ટ્રોન TTTIS refere to lan abstraction layer between tradition a distinct of the protection of and user applicationes. and user applicationship and the stress the stress is 0s-level ortualization creater insolated container on a single physical server and the Os meaner to attrive the hondurare and coffware in data Centers-

T containers behave litre real servers! [be -> Oc-level vistualization is commonly used in creating virtual hosting enumerites to tillocate handware resources among a longe number of mutually disputing -> It is also used, to alesser enterst, to considering server hordwarre by moong services on separate hosts Anthe water in the series of t into que contruiners , (m) vins more server. Cibracy Support level. Most applications use MPIC, exported by user-level System calls by Albert Hoan Wing lengthy sytem calles to and and the who tall wider for which has -the de. -> Since most extend " provide , well- documented " APDE, such as interface becomes mother andidate + for subidizer on which which is in the form it is possible bycontrolling the communitation lints between applications and the nest of a system through Apt hoods which which sen source comparishing the dins which approach to support wondows applied to so top of UNARX hosts. Another example is the volume and allows Another example is the VCUDA which allowed graphir of 1. applications eventing wittom voice to leverage Q.J.20 hardware allelaration.

G Ucer- Application level 5 > virtualization at the application level unrhuglizes an application as avon $22^{4+\frac{1}{2}}$ or, an application often suns as -7.- on a traditional a process. Therefore, application ilevel unitualization, is also known de process-level unitualization. is to deploy high level -> The most popular approach language (HLC) Vinc. h phi phone it a sites as an application programs won topics operating and the layer exposts an abstraction of a vin their can sun programs watten and compiled to aposticular abstract Ser the ser defnition. -91 other forms of application-level unbralization are travon $\sim 10^{-1}$ as application realition, application, and boing or application as application realition, application, and boing or application streaming and real in realitic must be publication streaming and independent only on the ball land sull by a subject with thing algorith worth of af second of which a second a gradient a gradient of the second 2월 24일 alls about the second second second and the set of the second

Harris Martin Martin Martin
Virtualization structures Mools and machaniens; ()
-> -there are three typical classes of Vm ministrative.
the operating system manager the
handware and the operating system.
a couch of the the mendia and on the mendia
for conventing partions of the real handwork into untrial
+ Therefore, different appraiting systems kuch as hitror and windows can own on the same physical markines
smuttanerously.
-> Depending on the position of Untualization layer,
there are several classes of m onehitectures, namely
the hipervisor onchitecture, para unhalization, and host-back viblatization.
-> The hypersterr is also known as the vision (united machine
monitor). They both perform the anne undersection
operats one.
Hypervisor and Xen Architecture:-
-> The hypervisor supports handwork -level virtualization
these metal delates wire to indicate the
network interfaces. When in Star UL
-7 The hypervisor software sits directly oretween
physical hondustre and the Oc.

-) This circulization layer nefferred to as effor the unin or the hypervicor. > Depending on the functionality, a hypervisor can assume a mino- Kernel anchitecture (on monoliteic hypersisor and itely Similar around at the that can be pointed and unidouging of Amicro Kernel hypervisor includes only the basic and unidouging functions (such as physical memory on an oggionerst and processor scheduling). The device drivers and other changeeble componente ave outside the hyposoiser. -4 A monolethic hypervisor implements all the abovementioned -functions, including those of the device drivers. The Ken Architecture -7 Xen is an open course hyperioiser program diveloped by Cambridge University. Xen is a micro Kanel hyperoisor. -> xen doesnot include any durice drivers natively. 7 It just provider mechanism by which a quest os cars have direct agents to the physical devices. - + X-en provider a unitial environment located between the hondware and OC. -The number of vondors are in the process of diveloping commercial ten hyperorsors, among them are Citit Xen Cenver and Oracle Vm.

0 Civert Domain quetperior control, Ilo (Danairo) Kenolinud DomainO XERI (Hyperdisor) Hondosome devices The Xen architecture special domain O for control and \$10, and several quest domains for user applicition The quest Os, which have control ability, is called Domain O, and the others are celled domain O. > Domain O ce a privileged quest Op of xen. It is front cooded when Xen boots without any file system drowers beig aussibile. Domain O is designed to access handware directly and manage dusces. > Therefore, one of the responsibilities of Domaina is to allocate and map hondroome resources for the quest domains (the domain () domaine).

-> For example, ten is based on linux and its (0)management unce maned Domain O, which has the provilege to manage other uns implemented on the an where had when Come host. > If pomain O is comprovinised, the harter an control the entire system. -> So, in the Vin System, sewaity policies are needed to improve the scurity of Domain O. -> Demain Ose behaving as a vinio, allows issenses. Create, Copy, Save, read, modify, shore, migredi, and vollbacts WMs as easily as manipulating a file, which flentbly provides themendous benefits for where.

Level Notralization love vistualization approach OS doesn't use a hypervisor et all. Instrad. the vixtual ration capability is part of the hose os, which performs all the functions afg fuely vietuatied hyperisor. is The biggest Scritation of this approach is that and the guest serves hurst gun the Sare OS and menters Cerves Amaria Sare OS. Each Vintual Service durains independent from all the other. But you can't MER I hatch operating 5/19 arrong the Becc all the guess spelatog stre percety be the sate, that is called a horrogeneous gargeon mene

the second se
Binary Translatton with Full unitualization _ (1) [
- Handware Untration Boss
A full Untralization
as Houst based untradization madify the host
-> Hust based introdization madify -10 e host -> Full intradization doemot need to madify -10 e host -> Full intradization doemot need to trap and to intradize
- full vitualization translation to trap and a since
CE. It relies on sensitive, non pirceduradore mention
Os. It relies on binary translation is trap the evention of certain sensitive, nonurtualizable instructione the event of certain sensitive, nonurtualizable instructione
The quest are and the
The guest used and critical instructions.
monoritical and critical instructions. The hast based system, both a host oc and a gruet (The a hast based system, both a host oc and a gruet (The a hast based system)
Of one used. Polytoine byer is built between .
un lottware layer is
+ the host or and quest de.
the host on
Full virtualization non costicel instructions
> with full untratizations)
our on the him directly write votes.
VMM to be entreed 5
-7 Both the hyperistrar and VAM approaches are
Considered full untualization.
Considered in the time to the performance
7 Brany translation can incur a large performance
La Lamp not only can proof the therease hat
also can ensure Systems sensity.

Repuets aring a umm Q Bmony translation of cluest oc This apparent was implemented by vincome and many other software compounde. Voucoure puts the vonn at Ring O and quest Oc at Ring 4. 7 the vomm same the instruction stream identifica the privileged, control-and behavior sensitive instruction when these instructions are identified, they are tappy into the MMM. The method used in this emulation which emileter the behavior of these instructions is called "bronzy buneletion" +) Therefore, full orstrialization combines binersy translation and direct evention, conseparatly, the guest as is unuse that is being contradined. The performance of full ortualization is not ideal because it involve bringsy voluit is nother tone consummer. Gronsletton Host based alternative un orchiteture is to install or criticalization > An layer on top of the host Or. -Direct envition of user user apps repriets Rings Rug2 quest-Os Ring1 VMM RigO Binany -bandition of CC coefficients. Host computer System Handwood 7 This host Os is still responsible for monoging floe honduite - The guest Oses are installed and sun on topos the Untualization layer.

Bra - UPstualization Architecture, -B Divect Twee apps Ruig3 evention et Rigs wer repuerts Reight Para nortuatived of system call guest-Oie "Hypercalle" to the Rogo construction byer Upstralization byjer replace nonuntuali zakle de insbuittons Host computer System bonduoone a para circultized quest de assisted by an intelligent compiler to replace non-orrhelizat by hypercalls. Os instructions Application Application Poroci moto di rico parra- Untralized guest-operating quest operating 8ysters system Hyperioteor Umm Handware Pond virtualised up or or hitertune, which privaling modifying the quest at Kennel to replace non unitualiscable instructional with hypercalle to the hyperusson or the vinim to consyout the untration process

	-> Dedicated applications may sun on the vise. (4)
1	Certainly, some other applications canadis our
	with the hast as directly.
	-> This host based onerliteiture has come distinct
	advantages, as enumerated next.
이 1944 같은 사람 같은	-Africt, the user can install this VM and steeline
	without modifying host OC.
-	-> me untualizing saftware can vely on the host as
	to provide device drivers and other bristerel sentices
	- This will somplify the VM denon and ease sits deployence
- 22	- This will simpary the will a main hast
	-> second, the host - based approach appende to many hast
	machine configurations.
	-> the performance of host-based and bettine may also
1	be low.
AN A	Para Virtualization with compiler Support -
*** //	Pona-virtualization neede to modify the guest operating
	Systems: A pare-virtuelized VM provides special APIC
	regiment substantial Oc moticetions in user
	applications. However, pona-virtualization attempts
	to reduce the unstralization overhead, and this
	insprove performance by modifying only the quest as
1	
	Kenel
	A CONTRACTOR OF
19 19 19	<u>n na na</u>

The traditional X86 processor aftere four instruction
event on angs. King 0,1,2, and 8. The buser theme
number, the higher the privilege of instruction
being energies
The actis responsible managing the bordware.
and the protleged instructions to evente at
Rigo, volite user-level applications sur at
Rung &.
-7 when X86 processor is Mistralized, a ontralization
layer is inserted between the hondware and the
Os the ist tight that him should also be installed
Os. the orstualization layer should also be instilled
at King O.
-> forre- urtralistation replaces non virtuali zeable
instructions with hypercalls that communicate
directly with the hypervisor or unin.
However, when the guest astrongly modified for
istratization, it can not onger supportive
hondusarie directly.
-> compared to full untrializedian, pond untralization
is relatively easy and more martial to min
is relatively easy and more practical the main problem is full unitualization, porra is the low
Performance in binary francistic
Performance in binony translation. Therefore,
and the boundary key
KVM (Kemel-Based VM), and voluone Est one lood examples.

KVM (Kemel-Based VM)

ø or this is a linear para-untualization systems - a pointof the linual version 2.6.20 Kennel. -> memory management and scheduling activities are ansted out by the enisting linux kert. The two does the nest, which makes at simpler than the hyperoison that controls the entire modilie y kum is a hondistance - assisted pona-vistualization tool, which inopsomes performance and supports unnadified quest one such as wondows, linuse, Solonis and other Unit variant, Pena-virtualization with compiler Support. onlike the full ontralization on the two which intercepts and enclates privileged and sensitive instructions at runtime, pona - virtuatization handle these instructions at compile time. -> The quest as kinnel is modified to septimeter point ged and sensitive instructions with hyperal to the hypervisor or vinan. Hen assumes such a Paraturtualization aschiteative. -9 The privileged instructions are implemented by typical to the hyperorror. After seplaing the instructions with hypercalle, the modified quest as provide the behavior of the original quast-oc. hypercalle apply a dedicated sensice sorthe instan.

Vistualization of CPU, Hemory, AND Ilo Destare. 7 To support instualization, processore wan as x86 employ a special rainning mode and instructions, known as pardivare assisted vistualization. -> In this young the imm' and quest ac run in different modes and all censitive instructions of the guestice and the applications are trapped in the vmm. Hand assame support for Virtualization Modern operating systeme and processors permit mattiple processes toxin simultaneously. It that is no protection mechanism in a processor, all instructions from different Rocesses will allers the hondware directly and cause a system -> Therefore, all processors have atleast two modes, user onesh. mode and supervision mode, to ensure controlled auuss of entital hondware. -> Instructions oranning in supervisor mode one called prorleged instructions. Other instructions are compristeged instantione. -> In a unitualized enumeriment, it is more difficult to make Osex and applications occurs concerly because to ere are more layers in the machine stack.

CPU untualization -(8) > Avm is a duplicate of an entiting computer system in which a majority of the pm instructions one encited on the bat processor in a native mate Thus, unprivileged instructions of une run directly on the base mailtime for higher efficiency. -> Other critical instructions should be handled carefully for correctness and , and stalo they. The facebook ziete ordani The critical instructions are devided into the categories: 1> phuleged, 1 iostructions; And the WARD with as control constructions is malicities 3> Behausour densitive instructions, 2010 2018 - Rivillegerd instructions paracite in a privilleged mode and will be trapped of energied outside story imode a sorri control- scoretive instructione "attempt" to change their configuration of reconnect used and with heritic-12 Barness Betrio our-sensitive instructions parsen different behavioring depending on the configuration it shipernices, including board and store operational over-the protoal memory winners + A CRU Architecture in untralizable of the supports -the to run the MM's printinged, and unprivilleged ability instructions in the cputer upole while timm thing in the supervisor mode

+ when the privilegred instructions in eluding control and behavior - sensitive instructions of avm are evented, they ave trapped in the vom In this case, the vom atte as a unifical mediator of handware access from different voicto gunantee the correctness and eterbility of the whole igiters . > However, not all epo antitatives are untualizable. Risc QU antitectures can be naturally ontralized because all control-and behavior-sensitive instructions are privileged instructions. On the contrary, x86 CPO anchitectures are not primorely designed to support unruch xation. Hundware -Assisted Qu untualization - This technique attempts to simplify untradization because full or porraunstudization is complicated Intel and AMD add an additional mode called privilege mode level (some people call it Ring-4) to x86 processors. Therefore, operating systems can still non at Ring 0 and the hypernition can run at Ring-4. -> All the probleged and sensitive instructions are trapped in the hypervisor automatically. This technique removes the difficulty of implementing binary translations of full instializ -ation. It also lets the operating system own in voic without modification. Fin Intal Hondware Assisted CPU untralization; -Atthough x36 processors one not untilationable primarily great effort is taken to virtualize them. They are used ididely in companing RISC processors that the built of x86-

Processors is detailed in the following sections. (20)Intel VT-X technology is an example of handcoarie- assisted ortalization CPU state-for unerased of Ring B. APPE productional instantional remoderal AJPS At the time of this using, Ri-go LUTIOXP Nen, Vincome, and the 1 usin Xp VM VM enlay exit VMX. Microsoft openal PC all Custon Custon -root Vmr9 implement their hyperoisore mode Win control ituding memory and by using the VIX 主人のいかも、「「ないのない technology. TYF-X (RJO) Processore with CPUO VT+x(or VT-)) Intel hardware assisted CPU virtualization. -> Intel cells the privilege level of x86 procestor's the WOX Root Made. In order to control the start and stop of VM. and outlocate a manney page to maintain. Generally, handware - assisted utrialization should have high ettictency. However, lince the transition from the hyperoise to the quest or incurs high overhead exitences between processor module it competines connect outperform bridly Hence, unitualization system such as visionic now use translation. a hybrid approach, in which a few touts one obblocided. to the handware but the nest in still done in software. -> In addition, pana unitualization and handware - assisted combined to improve the con be Untralization further. performance

The VMM is responsible to mapping the grant physical memory to the actual machine memory. VM2-Pro-Coss 1 Bocers) Poolog 1. Process ? monary Physical PA memory Machnema memory tion-level mapping procedure. -> Since each page table of the grust a has a separate pye table in the vinion corresponding it, the union pige table is called the shadow pige table. -> The MMU handles virtual to - physical translation defined by Oc. ત્વર -> then the physical memory addresses are bandited to maihine addresses using another set of page tables defined by the hypervisor. 7 since modern operating systems inautain a set of page tables for avery process, the shadow page tables will get flooded conceptiently, the performance overhead and cost of memory will be very high. -> VMWare cuses chadow page tables to perform untral memory-to-machine-memory affoces translation.

. Hemory Virtualization: -釣 > vestual memory vistualization is smiler to the Virtual memory support provided by modern operating -Systems -1 In a braditional evention environment, the operating system maintaine mapping of virtual memory to mailine mornooy using page tribles, which is a one-stype mapping from united morning to machine memory. -> All modern x86 (pus include a memory management Unit (HMU) and a branstation bookacide buffer(TB) to optimize virtual memory performance. -> Virtual memory virtualization involves channing the physical systems monory in RAM and dynamically alloading it to the physical memory of the VMC. That means a two-stage mapping process should be maintained by the quest or and the unm, respectively virtual memory to physical memory and physical memory to machine memory. -> The guest or continues to cotrol the mapping of virtual addresses to the physical memory addresses ofm c. -) But the quest or cannot directly access the actual machine memory.

7 Processorie use TLB handenne to map the until memory directly to the machine memory to appid the too livels of translation on every access. - when the guest Oc changes the virtual memory to aphysical memory mapping, the upon updates the shadow page tables to enable a direct. loorup. LI - novaly Cache that is don'the build into the michoproteisor, which is its for storing the Hersphroutsons screens diaman CALL information. - thus it is also bathed plansing comp main ~ valy Val Car. -> also heferland to as The induced tothe H Diel 4 as sin carbo -> Cache Mill 7 is an Event in which a Sin or appp: which takes a hoghest to herbieve date flor q Could be the speculic dure a not culturally to A Cuto M'S Requires the system or (ache FLOUND. application to reak a Record astrupt to socale the dous, this time against the stabil nain databil Cartille. is H/w or s/w Component glad stores data so That those signeds for that down that be y had in a last is the data stored in a lache night be the signed of an sallich computation are copy of dura Stand data so that police to qual s too that dura (an be servered forther. A cache is a nessourid storation to called A cache is a nessourid storation to called remodery dosta to help webstery, blowsters, V apps Lo calin that calling Longer data is a conjunce laptop of phone 2000 toyen it aff. you'll find Suni vier by a a party 2000 chousen it aff. you'll find Suni vier by a garache

Ilo Virtualization: manging the routing virtualization involves 7 Ilo requests between vistual deutices and the Ø.j. Ilo charred physical handware. there are three ways to implement 1/0 unitials i> Full ded ce emulation atton: a> pona-virtualization. 3> direct Ilo. full destre emulate on its the first approach for -7 510 untralization. Guests device draver quest Os DB-La dovert intruction lenter where device white indication buyer Divice emulites the Urtualdera enebion - remaps quest and selito Ilo Stack addressa - multiplenessand drives the Diricedorier -210 faitures ey, consiste Rest device - mour be different Spawned - Legin Produce or Chrono perse where Device enclosion for 210 introdication inoplemented inside the middle byer fligt maps set \$10 dering urtual desokes into the for the guest device to use,

Full device approved the all tunctions of a first ee grach as device ememotion, identification, interrupts, and DMA, one replicated in safet-work.

> This software is located in the UMM and attend a virtual device. The Ito access requests of the great Os are trapped in the UMM which interacts with the Ito devices.

-> The priabilitation methods of I/o untualization is typically used in them. It is also thrown as split driver medel consisting of a fronteric driver and ballard driver.

-7 The frontend onner is running in Domain O and the bactiend driver is surning in Domain O. - The frontend driver is surning in Domain O. - The frontend driver is neiponsite guest Oces and backend driver is neiponsite for monaging the neil FID devices and Pana-Ilounbiolization achieves better device performance than full device emolistron, it comes with a higher CPO'overhead.

7 Direct Ilo untualization lets the UM areas devices directly. It can achieve close to native performance without high CPO costs. Comment direct Ilo untualization implementions focus on networking for mainframes.

Viortual clusters and Resource Menagement -96 servers Ciphysical Auphysical cluster is a collection of machines) inter connected by a physical network such as a line. -> Sitterial clusters are built with time installed at distribute serveris from one one more physical cluters. the UM is a virtual cluster are interconnected vorically by a usitual network across several physical networks. -> There are three critical design issues of vistal clusters: 1> live migration of vinc, 25 memory and file migrations, - and dynamic deployment of unreal clusters. physical versue visitual ductors: - todeh virtual dustor is formed with physical marking where the implemented on a un hosted by multiple physical clusters. physical configured Physical physical clusters cluster 1 cluster? 11 1 1 11 4 P 3 A cloud pletform with four intrial clusters over three. physical clusters shaded differently.

The properties of virtual cluebers. 27 ->, The virtual cluster nodes can be ettion physical or untual machines. Multiply Most running with different oces and be deployed on the same physical node. -> A vos reus costs aquest oc, which is often different = from the host Or, that managere the resource in the physical machine, where the von is implemented. - The sixe (number of nodes) of a ontrol cluster can grow a short dynamically) conitor to the way an overlay. nlw vorties to size in a peer-to-peer (P>p) nlw. > The faiture of any physical model may disable some installed on the farling nodes. But the farlure of vms vene will not pull down the hast systems -Fast-Depbyment and Effective Scheduling:--> the system chould have the capability of fast deployment. -> Here deployment means two things the construct and Odistribute software stades (OG (thraster, applicitions) to a physical mode inside dueters as fast as forsible, and to quickly switch mintime environments from one user's ustical cluster to another user's withal cluster. -> Mapping vine onto the most appropriate physical node Should promote performance. Welt loads at one node to the mighalics of Uns allows welt loads at one node to the fight is another node to der a flaguncy of the Load salarce of Using the done to workform the about is no in the Jog tast can be done to workform the about is no -> 151 E

-> Dynamiscally adjusting loads among nodes by live migration of voic is desired, when the loads on cluster nodes become VFTINPLON WALL quite balanced. العامين (١٥ م. (١٥ - ٢٠٢ م.) (١٠٢٠ م.) (١٠٢٠ م.) Ju day 11-(1.3 High-performance Virtual Storage - 424 It is important to efficiently manage the diets spaces occupied by template software pairages one storage, in architectures design an be applied to reduce duplicates VATING IN Hoe dist of reduce duplicated blocks in adjustmibuted file system of untrail dusters. - y vers have their own profiles which store the identification of the data blocks for corresponding VMs in a user - specific united cluster. created when users modify -> New data blocks, one the corresponding dation / 1. Live von Migration, Steps and Pedermance Effects;--> In a cluster built with mixed nodes of host and quest operally systems, the normal method of operator 12 is to sun everything on the physical machine. 7 when a vim-fastis, its sole could be replaced by another vm on a different node, as long as they both mun with the same guest OC. or In, other astrale, apprical node can fail over to avon on another host. b

- This is different from physical to-physical failerof
in a traditional physical chuster. The advantage is enhanced faiturer flexibility.
The political desidents is that all must
stop playing its cole of the residing host node-fail
sup paying an be mitigated with
-7 However this poolders are be mitigated with
von life migration
live migration of a vm consists of the following the
Steps -
Stopo and 1; start migration - This step makes preparation
for the migration, including the migrating von and destination hast.
destination hast.
step2: Transfor memory since the vehole evention
state of un is stored in mernony, sending the unis
memory to the destinction node ensuries continuity
of the sensice provided by vin.
steps; - Suspend the VM and copy the last proton
of the doto - The migrating vide evention is
Suspended when the last convolas revenuesy sur
is transflerred During this step, the mind rupped
and its applications will no longer num This reservice unavailable "time is called "downthing of migration.
reservice unavailable time is could councilities

Stepf and 5 - composit and authorite the new host After all the needed stated is copied, on the destinction host, the vin releads the states and reusing the evention of programs in it, and the sensite provided by this vin continue. The whole migration process finishes by removing the original vin -from the source hast. Ne empirement Staged: Pre-Higherton on Host Active viriantest A Alternate physical host may be pueled of migration BUCR deut cel missioned and represent Stagent: Resemption Initialize acontainer on the adhat overhead due to Stages, Iterative precon Grable shadow paging espym copy donty pages in successive rounds posptime 2. Stop and copy "scupend vm on host A Stage 3. VM out of service Generate ARP to redirect traffic to Host B. commitment Stoge 4: vos State on Host A-is seleased vin nunning normally Stage 5: Activation Vinstants on that B connects to local durica Resumes normal operation Uve Migration Process of avis from ondisticological

the Person of all
Migration of menning, files, and Naturals Resources
system migrates to another physical
Migrotion of mental, iter migrates to another physical in when one system migrates to another physical in the solution of the second consider the following theme.
node, use
1 Hernory Migroution, - This is the one of the most important aspects of vin migration. Hernory inigration can be innorge of vin migration. Hernory inigration can be innorge
of vin more applied in atypical
of hundreds of megabytes, to be done in an
system today, and
- the Internet Suspend. Resume (IIR) technique exploite
to least Suspend - Resume (JLR)
The Internet Superid - Keinste considerable temporal locality this refers to have considerable
temporal locality this refers to name and instained inst
overlap is the more staties differ by the amount
overlap in the suspended and the differ by the amount of a lim, the memory statter differ by the amount
of work done some there each tild
helve berg united inter of small substitutes
in the system is to both superded and
and mesumed vin instances. The advantage of
and mesumed vin inclaimed internal of flag is
and measured von measurementation of files is -using a tree-based representation of files is
that causing the barre been changed.
i na se ^{entr} ation de la companya de La companya de la comp Reference de la companya de la compa
같은 1월 1일, 1월 1일

2. If system Migration :-(2)Support von migration, a system must provide each To Vm with a consistent; location-independent view of the file system that is available on all hosts. -> A smple way to achieve this is to provide each von with sts own virtual diets which the file system is mapped to and transport the constants of this virtual dists along with other states of -> Due to the current terend of high aparty diste migration of the contents of entire dick overanders is not a viable solution. Another way is to have a global file system ' across all machines where a vin could be located. -7 This way remained the need to copy files from one machine to another because all files are network accessible. 3. Network Migration:--7 to enable memote systems to locate and communicate with aven, each ver must be assigned a uptual IP address Known to other entities. This address can be distinct from the IP address of hort machine where the Vm is currently breated. - tach un can also have the own distinct until MAC asloners.

	9
-> The VMM maintains a mapping of the untial TP and MAC addresses to their corresponding UME. In general, a migrating vm includes all the protocol states and correspondences with st.	
-> It the source and destination machines of a VM migration are typically connected to a single switch WAN, an uncollicited ARP reply formities rolganting host is provided advertising that the IP has moved to a new location.	
> This solvies the open network connection portiens by reconfiguring all the peers to send furture parties to a new location.	
Dynamic deployment of Virtual clusters: The dynamic deployment of four untual cluster mesearch project a discribed and their objectives and reported results.	
Project Name Design Objectives Repairing	
cluster on Demand at Dute University cattle University cattle University cattle University cattle University cattle University cattle University cattle University cattle University cluster on a shored condensity cluster on a shored on multiple processor curder avinn cattle Cluby processor curder avinn cattle Cluby processor	の意識が変化など、シントンを

A) Project Name	Design abjectives		N/
VIOLIH at	Multiple vm clustering toprove	Reduce eventions	Щ.
Revolue Oniversity	the advantage of	scining used is	
	dynamic adaption	and seeping 5	
CIRAAL project at	penformance of pared	lal 75% motors, Renforma	
IHRIA is France	algorithms in Xen-	acheeved with	
**	cluster-s	BOY RESONER VIN	VE
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		an a	
		(c)	 A A

Vistualization for deta center Automation (35)
-> Datacenters have grown rapidly in record years, and all
major It companies one pouring their necourses the building
Men ag the thirty .
-> Ditacenter automation means that huge volumes of
his din and detabuse resources in
그는 그는 것이 있는 것이 없는 것이 있는 것이 없는 것이 없 않이 않는 것이 없는 것이 없이 않이
can be allocated agranceercy with goaranted Doc and cost-
effects venere.
1. Server consolidition in Detacenter's
I while a tways the conter was
-> To gunantee that a wontroad with a common to cope with all demand levels, there fore at is common to cope with all demand levels, there fore underwith lized
to cope with all demand levels, there price underwith lized that most services in data centers are underwith lized
Alonge amount of handworker, space, power, and management
cost of these servers is wasted.
cost of most on approach to improve a
-> A server consolidation is an approach to improve the tous white natio of handware resources by reducing
the low white natio of handware recourses
the number of physical servers.
+ Among several server consolidation techniques
such as centralized and physical consolidation,
virtual-based server consolidation techniques is
the most powerful.

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-> Consolidation enhances hardworke while zotion. Money underwillized somers are consolidated into fewer somers to enhance resource utilization. Consolidation aleo facilitates backup sources and disaster recordy. -> This approach enables more agrile provisioning and deployment of resources. In a virtual environment the images of the guest Oles and their applications are the images of the guest Oles and their applications are are dily cloned and reused.

-> The total cost of appenship is reduced. In this sense, sover ontralization reduces panchase of new sense, sover maintenance costs, and lower pover, servers, lower maintenance costs, and lower pover, cooling and cabling requirements.

> This approach improves awailability and business

contruisty. To automate deta center operations, one must consider resource scheduling, antituitural support; consider resource scheduling, antituitural support; power management, automatic on autonomic sepure power management, automatic on analytical models, and so management, performance of analytical models, and so management, performance of analytical models, and so on. In virtualized deta anters, an efficient, on-dom on. In virtualized deta anters, an efficient, on-dom -and, fine gravined schedular is one of the tree -and, fine gravined schedular is one of the tree -factors to improve resource whiteat on.

2. Virtual storage Mounagement ;-Previously, -> storage unitualization was largely used to describe the aggregation and repartitioning of disks at peny course time cales for use by physical mouthing. -> In system virtualization, virtual storage includes the strage managed by vimme and guest Occes. Generally, the data stored in this enotronment can be classified into two categories : Vm images 2> application data. -> Von images are special to the virtual equipronoment While application data includes all other deta which is some as the data in boditional de environments a vistualization larger is inserted between the hardwee and traditional operating systems on a traditional operating System is modified to support vistualization. it complicate on the otherhand, stagage management of the quest of performe aus though it is operating in a real hard dists while the givest areas annot areas the hand dists directly on the other hand, many quest ones content hand diets volville three guest-class connot toccess when many vois one running on a single physical machine. Storage monagement of the underlying promo is much more complexit-thorn that of guest Oresi (Battanday)

+In data centers, there are often thousands of um which course the VM images to become flooded. Pariallan is a distributed storage system customized for contractization environments. Content addresselle Storage (CAS) is a colution to occlude the total size of vior images, and therefore supports a large set of vm-based systems in detal centers. Since traditional strage management techniques do not consider the features of storage in untralization enomonments, parallant designs a novel anchiteuture in which storage features that have traditionally been implemented NW WW administration NOM Xer demains ME VE Mm stand devi e VMMXer Feinvice et or the [Voc 115 wo. VINIO (XeD) parallar is a set of per-host storage appliances that short access to a common block device and perente vortral dicke to drent vrois.

> Nimbus, Easalyptus and OpenNebula are all open@) source software available to the general public. only usphere this a proprietary or for cloud resource virtualization and management over diale anters. the Eacalyptus for vortual Hebricking of private cloud. -> Eacallyptus is an open source sho program intended maily for supporting Ioas clouds I doud manager Public netook Gm Gm · Gronyp "monoget. private private neticols netwoods fintence monaged cluster 15 Ectedlyptus for purbling duster B. > mate detuits by establishing networks over the vors Unking through Ethremet and the Internet. -7. Instance Monager controls the eneution, inspection, and terminating of vin instances on the bust volco it runs. + Groupmanager gathers information about and schedule vin evention on specific instance managers as well as manages usitual instance network. -y cloud manager is the entry-part to the claud for users and administrators. It queenes node managers for information about resources.

3 Cloud	Octor Virtualize	d Data C	<u>nler ;-</u>	(A))
-7 Data (conters muet bie	Unitiolise	rd to corr	<u>o</u> ar ci	prid
Doubders	.				
Table- VI m	omagens (virtual 2	infrastructu	hi) and Oc	for Gire	
Data C	enters.			: 	
Manager) OS.,	Resource Being	clifents ABD,	Hypenisore	Clarcel Ostergeria	speint features
pleitforms Worse	ureb Linis	language	157. 1501ôn	Ee2-	vertel
julindus Unurli, Apache V2-	VMORETOR, USTONIL cluster, uscousinant project or 91.	DOPF.CUT	Xien, HWM		Unitual
Eccalyptus Louri, BCD	vistual nenositoria was evaluptus:conf	ROD WG, CLI	xen KVm	ROD	netvoks
Openitlebaler Univer,	Management of VM, host, interal network, and schedulig tools,	XML-RPC	a ren, KUM	Fra, Elatric Host	Vistual metuski dujnani c Risovi zion
Apachev2 Vigheret	winterestizing Or for	CLETUF,	, WHIWARE	Vincont	antertio)
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tor notreal	vit managers ar ixing data onters	s which t	offer and	a large	ŝ.
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f. Trust Monagement in wrowalized data Conters: (1) -> vmm changes the online computer and theatine. -> vmm is the base sandy of unbial agetm. -) once a hacker successfully enters to e vom or inanagement vm, the votio system is in danger. -> A cubtler problem onices in protocols that rely m the "feitness" of their random number some for generating services keys. Random number must be "fresh" for sensity purposes, 一方 -7 with a stream cipter, two different plaintents would be enarypted under the same tray strains, which could, in turn, expose both plaintents could be encurpted of the plaintents have subficient redundancy. VM Based intruston Detection:-- Intrastons are unauthorized access to a certain computer from local or network cusere and intrust on detection is used to recognize the unuthonized gecess. Custero Intrusion detection, build on or. 7 A typical tos can be classified into a hostbased IDS (HEDS) or a network based IDS (NOD) depending on the data source.

1.4 > A HEDS can be implemented on the monitored system. When the monitored system is attacked by hackess, A-NIF is based on the flows of networks traffic which can't detect fake actions.

X 이 동안 수 있는 것이 없다. Case Studies: Xen Virtual machine monitors The sen open source untreal machine monthly was originally created through the university of combridge and developed through Xonsource, and citral systems agguired ten course in DOOT. -> And technology has since emerged in the free edition Celled Kenserrer, along with two enterprise - class products: Essentials for pald Xensenver Enterprise and Essentials for Xensener -7 Other commercial implementations for Xen platmum. include Grade VM and Sun XVM. -> The ten open burice uptual machine monitor is designed for common Intel and IBM anchitectures, supporting X86(32 and 64bit), Itanium, and Powerth based systems. + The Xen-hypervisor loads and supports all the subsequent operating systems (Oses) and workloads. This is refferred as a type 1 (02) bare-metal hypervolisor, which ourse directly on the system's bandware and hoste Oses above it.

-7 There are many operating systems that an conteas a host operating system (domain 0). > The hypension in the Xen open source ustrial marline mention is posticularly noted for its withad marchine Live migration ceptilities, allowing adminichators to move utral workloads from one physical host to another without shidting down or even disrupting the workload being marred. > XenAPI - A Xen project Toolstack that appears the XenAPI identate. An interfecte for remotely configuring and controlling instralized quests ranning on a ven enabled host. XenAPI is the core component of Citrix HyperUssor/XonSover. Fach talstack exposes different tools om AP, which will our XENAPE adds additional functionality composed oth xen project to olfacts is batending the captuare to cover multiple hosts > Faithtaing real-time performance monitoring and alterng. -> creating upgrade and patching capabilities. Enabling nesource pools to include the migretten, and configuration, and disaster receivery. + Enhancing the vincificagele von migration.

VM ware 5-? Vincome is a situalization and cloud compiting software provider based in Palo Atto, alif ponded in 19.98. -y vincome its allosidary of Dell technologice. corporation originally acquired vinuase in Enc 2004 ; time was later required by Dell Technologies in 2016. -> vincone basel its unitualization technologies con ets bone-metal hypervitor in X86 onchitecture. -> A byper stars is installed on the physical conver to allow for multiple virtual markines (VMx) to nun on the come physical center. Multiple aces is non on one physical server, -> All the VIDX on the same physical some share resources such as networking and RAM. Vincome products :- vincome features -unitualization, networking vincoire producté include avid sevisity management toole, costroone defined detacenter software and sblage foftware. vincome veptice le vincomets suite of unitualization products, it is tronown as uncome infraubructure prior to 2009.

The Alexandra and the Source of the Source o

vincolone cloud on Aue, customers can our a cluster Vishere hosts with visith and NEX in an Amazon data conter and sun their workloads. VINDONE NEX is a pirtual networking and country software Created when vinware acquired Nicera in 2012. offering vinuoire cloud-foundation is an integrated capture Stack that burdles Uspher, VOWare VEAN and visicone mex isto a single plutforms, storage fectors that imware vern is a software based is built into the Esxi hypennison and integrated with vephere. it pools dist space from multiple text hosts and provisione it via enoust policil È. VRealize sait allow a way to create and mounge vouvoirie Honixon allows organizations. workspace one allows an administrator to control mobile device and cloud hosted ontial destrops. vocuarie unskitch on is the product ever released by Stor company to create and voil driedly on a sing writeries or brins dig trop or liptop. VMBOOM Figion it is show like vince work tetion for more computere

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	- Microsoft Virtual Server is acadable server virtualization - Program distributed by Microsoft that enables	Non
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	- program distributed of monaute muses	65 . P
	multiple operating exitense (acc) to run on a single	
	multiple operating selens (and to rain our ye	199 - L
	physical Server.	
4		يستحريها ا
	destruction destruction	
1	> The program operates without the poory	$1 \ge 1 \ge 1$
	La	
÷.	drivers and provides isolation between persitions.	
	> The program operates continue third-posty device drovers and provides isolation between postitions.	la de la de
-t-	> is a lemon is commonly, insed for	Nie
1	I Microsoft virtual server le commonly used for server consolidation in business networke and datei	
1	in business networks and data	
1	Server consoliage or	133.45
9	2 - Schreiter - La	1993
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	coltrano developera	
	-> It can also be used by software developers.	ALC: NO
•	-> Version 2005 RD can support up to 64 quest Oss and	
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	enjury symmetric multiprocessing but doesnot untrustize	
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. 1	with Microsoft's vortial server 2005 R2, administrators	
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99 S.		1.7.822

Accessed fifty --> VS2005R2 administration is performed through a uses brouser rather than through an application interface. > Using aweb browser interface sparce the clien form having to install a client application on the usarla cystems. The proposers interface is used to treate machiner, テ to storat and stop them; to change their configuration (memory size, locations of ontral hard dicke etc), and to gain acces to the virtual console console. 7 A-caser can connect remately to the same through the brouser or through a standalone application called the untrail machine Remote control client (maco. Accessing a remote sever though the web interforce requires an Active Control and the VMRCC is usidous only. Lewsty:--> users or groups can be given varying lively of alless to the visitual servers, much as they an have access to plaz or folders. Agivers are group could be allowed to access a server but not to change the properties.

-> connectrons to the VC2005R2 website should normally bedone via SSL. this is especially recommended of you're accessing VC2005R2 from oritaide a prevail. Resource allocation.

→ when you have maltiple servirial servirs running on one host, you'll probably wan to assign limits on the resources tarabable to each united server. → When you clicts on united server Resource Allowing and you will see alist of all the available writed servers, along with the monetimeum and immonum armount of CPU you can set for each. → Each Server can also be assigned an Indexc

alled accretetive weight" from 1 to 10,000 (the default is 100).

-> The higher the weight, the more preference a given server gets interms of recourse allocations.

Simpting --> Virtual cervers can have command-line sampts assigned to nun when contain actions.

performed (like turning a machine on off) of vohen unitual dists space is 1000

- These scripts an be angling from bitchjobs to cophiltiteted vescripts that make changes to Server configurations via vescots rele notestable.

CryptDB: Protecting Confidentiality with Encrypted Query Processing

Raluca Ada Popa, Catherine M. S. Redfield, Nickolai Zeldovich, and Hari Balakrishnan *MIT CSAIL*

\$10.00.

ABSTRACT

Online applications are vulnerable to theft of sensitive information because adversaries can exploit software bugs to gain access to private data, and because curious or malicious administrators may capture and leak data. CryptDB is a system that provides practical and provable confidentiality in the face of these attacks for applica- tions backed by SQL databases. It works by executing SQL queries over encrypted data using a collection of efficient SQL-aware en- cryption schemes. CryptDB can also chain encryption keys to user passwords, so that a data item can be decrypted only by using the password of one of the users with access to that data. As a result, a database administrator never gets access to decrypted data, and even if all servers are compromised, an adversary cannot decrypt the data of any user who is not logged in. An analysis of a trace of 126 million SQL queries from a production MySQL server shows that CryptDB can support operations over encrypted data for 99.5% of the 128,840 columns seen in the trace. Our evaluation shows that CryptDB has low overhead, reducing throughput by 14.5% for phpBB, a web forum application, and by 26% for queries from TPC- C, compared to unmodified MySQL. Chaining encryption keys to user passwords requires 11–13 unique schema annotations to secure more than 20 sensitive fields and 2-7 lines of source code changes for three multi-user web applications.

Categories and Subject Descriptors: H.2.7 [Database Man- agement]: Database Administration—Security, integrity, and pro- tection.

General Terms: Security, design.

1 INTRODUCTION

Theft of private information is a significant problem, particularly for online applications [40]. An adversary can exploit software vulnerabilities to gain unauthorized access to servers [32]; curious or malicious administrators at a hosting or application provider can snoop on private data [6]; and attackers with physical access to servers can access all data on disk and in memory [23].

One approach to reduce the damage caused by server compro- mises is to encrypt sensitive data, as in SUNDR [28], SPORC [16], and Depot [30], and run all computations (application logic) on clients. Unfortunately, several important applications do not lend themselves to this approach, including database-backed web sites that process queries to generate data for the user, and applications

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that compute over large amounts of data. Even when this approach is tenable, converting an existing server-side application to this form can be difficult. Another approach would be to consider theoret- ical solutions such as fully homomorphic encryption [19], which allows servers to compute arbitrary functions over encrypted data, while only clients see decrypted data. However, fully homomorphic encryption schemes are still prohibitively expensive by orders of magnitude [10, 21].

This paper presents CryptDB, a system that explores an interme- diate design point to provide confidentiality for applications that use database management systems (DBMSes). CryptDB leverages the typical structure of database-backed applications, consisting of a DBMS server and a separate application server, as shown in Figure 1; the latter runs the application code and issues DBMS queries on be- half of one or more users. CryptDB's approach is to *execute queries over encrypted data*, and the key insight that makes it practical is that SQL uses a well-defined set of operators, each of which we are able to support efficiently over encrypted data.

CryptDB addresses two threats. The first threat is a curious database administrator (DBA) who tries to learn private data (e.g., health records, financial statements, personal information) by snoop- ing on the DBMS server; here, CryptDB prevents the DBA from learning private data. The second threat is an adversary that gains complete control of application and DBMS servers. In this case, CryptDB cannot provide any guarantees for users that are logged into the application during an attack, but can still ensure the confi- dentiality of logged-out users' data.

There are two challenges in combating these threats. The first lies in the tension between minimizing the amount of confidential information revealed to the DBMS server and the ability to efficiently execute a variety of queries. Current approaches for computing over encrypted data are either too slow or do not provide adequate confidentiality, as we discuss in 9. On the other hand, encrypting data with a strong and efficient cryptosystem, such as AES, would prevent the DBMS server from executing many SQL queries, such as queries that ask for the number of employees in the "sales" department or for the names of employees whose salary is greater than


\$60,000. In this case, the only practical solution would be to give the DBMS server access to the decryption key, but that would allow an adversary to also gain access to all data.

The second challenge is to minimize the amount of data leaked when an adversary compromises the application server in addition to the DBMS server. Since arbitrary computation on encrypted data is not practical, the application must be able to access decrypted data. The difficulty is thus to ensure that a compromised application can obtain only a limited amount of decrypted data. A na "ive solution of assigning each user a different database encryption key for their data does not work for applications with shared data, such as bulletin boards and conference review sites.

CryptDB addresses these challenges using three key ideas:

 The first is to execute SQL queries over encrypted data. CryptDB implements this idea using a SQL-aware encryption strategy, which leverages the fact that all SQL queries are made up of a

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functions (UDFs) to perform cryptographic operations in the DBMS. Rectangular and rounded backs represent processes and data, respectively. Shading indicates components added by CryptDB. Dashed lines indicate separation between users' computers, the application server, a server running CryptDB's database proxy (which is usually the same as the application server), and the DBMS server. CryptDB addresses two kinds of threats, shown as dotted lines. In threat 1, a curious database administrator with complete access to the DBMS server snoops on private data, in which case CryptDB prevents the DBA from accessing any private information. In threat 2, an adversary gains complete control over both the software and hardware of the application, proxy, and DBMS servers, in which case CryptDB ensures the adversary cannot obtain data belonging to users that are not logged in (e.g., user 2).

well-defined set of primitive operators, such as equality checks, order comparisons, aggregates (sums), and joins. By adapt- ing known encryption schemes (for equality, additions, and or- der checks) and using a new privacy-preserving cryptographic method for joins, CryptDB encrypts each data item in a way that allows the DBMS to execute on the transformed data. CryptDB is efficient because it mostly uses symmetric-key encryption, avoids fully homomorphic encryption, and runs on unmodified DBMS software (by using user-defined functions).

The second technique is *adjustable query-based encryption*. Some encryption schemes leak more information than others about the data to the DBMS server, but are required to process certain queries. To avoid revealing all possible encryptions of data to the DBMS *a priori*, CryptDB carefully *adjusts* the SQL-aware encryption scheme for any given data item, depending on the queries observed at run-time. To implement these adjust- ments efficiently, CryptDB uses *onions of encryption*. Onions are a novel way to compactly store multiple ciphertexts within each other in the database and avoid expensive re-encryptions.

The third idea is to *chain encryption keys to user passwords*, so that each data item in the database can be decrypted only through a chain of keys rooted in the password of one of the users with access to that data. As a result, if the user is not logged into the application, and if the adversary does not know the user's password, the adversary cannot decrypt the user's data, even if the DBMS and the application server are fully compromised. To construct a chain of keys that captures the application's data privacy and sharing policy, CryptDB allows the developer to provide policy annotations over the application's SQL schema, specifying which users (or other principals, such as groups) have access to each data item.

We have implemented CryptDB on both MySQL and Postgres; our design and most of our implementation should be applicable to most standard SQL DBMSes. An analysis of a 10-day trace of 126 million SQL queries from many applications at MIT suggests that CryptDB can support operations over encrypted data for 99.5% of the 128,840 columns seen in the trace. Our evaluation shows that CryptDB has low overhead, reducing throughput by 14.5% for the phpBB web forum application, and by 26% for queries from TPC-C, compared to unmodified MySQL. We evaluated the security of CryptDB on six real applications (including phpBB, the HotCRP conference management software [27], and the OpenEMR medical records application); the results show that CryptDB protects most sensitive fields with highly secure encryption schemes. Chaining encryption keys to user passwords requires 11–13 unique schema annotations to enforce privacy policies on more than 20 sensitive

fields (including a new policy in HotCRP for handling papers in conflict with a PC chair) and 2–7 lines of source code changes for three multi-user web applications.

The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In 2, we discuss the threats that CryptDB defends against in more detail. Then, we describe CryptDB's design for encrypted query processing in 3 and for key chaining to user passwords in 4. In 5, we present several case studies of how applications can use CryptDB, and in 6, we discuss limitations of our design, and ways in which it can be extended. Next, we describe our prototype implementation in 7, and evaluate the performance and security of CryptDB, as well as the effort required for application developers to use CryptDB, in §8. We compare CryptDB to related work in §9 and conclude in §10.

2 SECURITY OVERVIEW

Figure 1 shows CryptDB's architecture and threat models. CryptDB works by intercepting all SQL queries in a *database proxy*, which rewrites queries to execute on encrypted data (CryptDB assumes that all queries go through the proxy). The proxy encrypts and decrypts all data, and changes some query operators, while preserving the semantics of the query. The DBMS server never receives decryption keys to the plaintext so it never sees sensitive data, ensuring that a curious DBA cannot gain access to private information (threat 1).

To guard against application, proxy, and DBMS server compro- mises (threat 2), developers annotate their SQL schema to define different *principals*, whose keys will allow decrypting different parts of the database. They also make a small change to their applications to provide encryption keys to the proxy, as described in 4. The proxy determines what parts of the database should be encrypted under what key. The result is that CryptDB guarantees the confi- dentiality of data belonging to users that are not logged in during a compromise (e.g., user 2 in Figure 1), and who do not log in until the compromise is detected and fixed by the administrator.

Although CryptDB protects data confidentiality, it does not ensure the integrity, freshness, or completeness of results returned to the application. An adversary that compromises the application, proxy, or DBMS server, or a malicious DBA, can delete any or all of the data stored in the database. Similarly, attacks on user machines, such as cross-site scripting, are outside of the scope of CryptDB. We now describe the two threat models

addressed by CryptDB, and the security guarantees provided under those threat models.§

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2.1 Threat 1: DBMS § Server Compromis

e

In this threat, CryptDB guards against a curious DBA or other exter- nal attacker with full access to the data stored in the DBMS server. Our goal is confidentiality (data secrecy), not integrity or availability. The attacker is assumed to be *passive*: she wants to learn confidential

data, but does not change queries issued by the application, query results, or the data in the DBMS. This threat includes DBMS soft- ware compromises, root access to DBMS machines, and even access to the RAM of physical machines. With the rise in database consolidation inside enterprise data centers, outsourcing of databases to public cloud computing infrastructures, and the use of third-party DBAs, this threat is increasingly important.

Approach. CryptDB aims to protect data

confidentiality against this threat by executing SQL queries over encrypted data on the DBMS server. The proxy uses secret keys to encrypt all data inserted or included in queries issued to the DBMS. Our approach is to allow the DBMS server to perform query processing on encrypted data as it would on an unencrypted database, by enabling it to compute certain functions over the data items based on encrypted data. For example, if the DBMS needs to perform a GROUP BY on column *c*, the DBMS server should be able to determine which items in that column are equal to each other, but not the actual content of each item. Therefore, the proxy needs to enable

the DBMS server to determine relationships among data necessary to process a query. By using SQL-aware encryption that adjusts dynamically to the queries presented, CryptDB is careful about what relations it reveals between tuples to the server. For instance, if the DBMS needs to perform only a GROUP BYon a column *c*, the DBMS server should not know the order of the items in column *c*, nor should it know any other information about other columns. If the DBMS is required to perform an ORDER BY, or to find the MAX or MIN, CryptDB reveals the order of items in that column, but not otherwise.

Guarantees. CryptDB provides confidentiality for data content and for names of columns and tables; CryptDB does not hide the overall table structure, the number of rows, the types of columns, or the approximate size of data in bytes. The security of CryptDB is *not perfect:* CryptDB reveals to the DBMS server relationships among data items that correspond to the *classes of computation* that queries perform on the database, such as comparing

items for equality, sorting, or performing[§] word search. The granularity at which CryptDB allows the DBMS to perform a class of computations is an entire column (or a group of joined columns, for joins), which means that even if a query requires equality checks for a few rows, executing that query on the server would require revealing that class of computation for an entire column. 3.1 describes how these classes of computation map to CryptDB's encryption schemes, and the information they reveal.

More intuitively, CryptDB provides the following properties:

Sensitive data is never available in plaintext at the DBMS server.

The information revealed to the DBMS server depends on the classes of computation required by the application's queries, subject to constraints specified by the application developer in the schema (\S 3.5.1):

- 1. If the application requests no relational predicate filtering on a column, nothing about the data content leaks (other than its size in bytes).
- If the application requests equality checks on a column, CryptDB's proxy reveals which items repeat in that column (the histogram), but not the actual values.
- 3. If the application requests order checks on a column, the proxy reveals the order of the elements in the column.

The DBMS server cannot compute the (encrypted) results for queries that involve computation classes not requested by the application.

How close is CryptDB to "optimal" security? Fundamentally, op- timal security is achieved by recent work in theoretical cryptography enabling any computation over encrypted data [18]: however, such proposals are prohibitively impractical. In contrast, CryptDB is prac- tical, and in 8.3, we demonstrate that it also provides significant security in practice. Specifically, we show that all or almost all of the most sensitive fields in the tested applications remain encrypted with highly secure encryption schemes. For such fields, CryptDB provides optimal security, assuming their value is independent of the pattern in which they are accessed (which is the case for medical information, social security numbers, etc). CryptDB is not optimal for fields requiring more revealing encryption schemes, but we find that most such fields are semi-sensitive (such as timestamps).

Finally, we believe that a passive attack model is realistic because malicious DBAs are more likely to read the data, which may be hard to detect, than to change the data or guery results, which is more likely to be discovered. In 9, we cite related work on data integrity that could be used in complement with our work. An active adversary that can insert or update data may be able to indirectly compromise confidentiality. For example, an adversary that modifies an email field in the database may be able to trick the application into sending a user's data to the wrong email address, when the user asks the application to email her a copy of her own data. Such active attacks on the DBMS fall under the second threat model, which we now discuss.

2.2 Threat 2: Arbitrary Threats

We now describe the second threat where the application server, proxy, and DBMS server infrastructures may be compromised arbitrarily. The approach in threat 1 is insufficient because an adversary can now get access to the keys used to encrypt the entire database.

The solution is to encrypt different data items (e.g., data belong- ing to different users) with different keys. To determine the key that should be used for each data item, developers annotate the ap- plication's database schema to express finergrained confidentiality policies. A curious DBA still cannot obtain private data by snooping on the DBMS server (threat 1), and in addition, an adversary who compromises the application server or the proxy can now decrypt only data of currently logged-in users (which are stored in the proxy). Data of currently inactive users would be encrypted with keys not available to the adversary, and would remain confidential.

In this configuration, CryptDB provides strong guarantees in the face of *arbitrary* server-side compromises, including those that gain root access to the application or the proxy. CryptDB leaks at most the data of currently active users for the duration of the compromise, even if the

proxy behaves [§] in a Byzantine fashion. By "duration of a compromise", we mean the interval from the start of the compromise until any trace of the compromise has been erased from the system. For a read SQL injection attack, the duration of the compromise spans the attacker's SQL queries. In the above example of an adversary changing the email address of a user in the database, we consider the system compromised for as long as the attacker's email address persists in the database.

3 QUERIES OVER ENCRYPTED DATA

This section describes how CryptDB executes SQL queries over encrypted data. The threat model in this section is threat 1 from §2.1. *The* DBMS machines and administrators are not trusted, but the application and the proxy are trusted.

CryptDB enables the DBMS server to execute SQL queries on encrypted data almost as if it were executing the same queries on plaintext data. Existing applications do not need to be changed. The DBMS's query plan for an encrypted query is typically the same as for the original query, except that the operators comprising the query, such as selections, projections, joins, aggregates, and orderings, are performed on ciphertexts, and use modified operators in some cases. CryptDB's proxy stores a secret master key *MK*, the database schema, and the current encryption layers of all columns. The DBMS server sees an anonymized schema (in which table and col- umn names are replaced by opaque identifiers), encrypted user data, and some auxiliary tables used by CryptDB. CryptDB also equips the server with CryptDB-specific userdefined functions (UDFs) that

enable the server to compute on ciphertexts for certain operations. Processing a query in CryptDB involves four steps:

- 1. The application issues a query, which the proxy intercepts and rewrites: it anonymizes each table and column name, and, using the master key *MK*, encrypts each constant in the query with an encryption scheme best suited for the desired operation (§3.1).
- The proxy checks if the DBMS server should be given keys to adjust encryption layers before executing the query, and if so, issues an UPDATE query at the DBMS server that invokes a UDF to adjust the encryption layer of the appropriate columns (§3.2).
- 3. The proxy forwards the encrypted query to the DBMS server, which executes it using standard SQL (occasionally invoking UDFs for aggregation or keyword search).
- 4. The DBMS server returns the (encrypted) query result, which the proxy decrypts and returns to the application.

3.1

We now describe the encryption types that CryptDB uses, including a number of existing cryptosystems, an optimization of a recent scheme, and a new cryptographic primitive for joins. For each encryption type, we explain the security property that CryptDB requires from it, its functionality, and how it is implemented.

Random (RND). RND provides the maximum security in CryptDB: indistinguishability under an adaptive chosen-plaintext attack (IND-CPA); the scheme is probabilistic, meaning that two equal values are mapped to different ciphertexts with

overwhelming probability **S**.On the other hand, RND does not allow any compu- tation to be performed

efficiently on the ciphertext **Q**. An efficient construction of RND is to use a block cipher like

AES or Blowfish in CBC Lmode together with a random initialization vector (IV). (We mostly use

AES, except for integer values, - where we use Blowfish for its 64-bit block size because the 128-bit

block size of AES would **a** cause the ciphertext to be significantly longer).

Since, in this threat model, **W** CryptDB assumes the server does not change results, CryptDB does not require a stronger

INDa-CCA2 construction (which would be secure under a

chosen-ciphertext attack). However, it wouldr be straightforward to use an IND-CCA2- secure implementation of RND

instead, such as a block cipher in UFE mode [13],

if needed. **C** Deterministic (DET). DET has a slightly weaker guarantee, yet it still provides strong security: it leaks only which encrypted values correspond to

the same data value, by **L**deterministically

generating the same ciphertext for the same plaintext. This encryption layer allows the server to perform equality checks, which means it can perform selects with equality predicates, equality joins, GROUP BY, COUNT, DISTINCT, etc.

In cryptographic terms, DET should be a pseudo-random permu- tation (PRP) [20]. For 64bit and 128-bit values, we use a block cipher with a matching block size (Blowfish and AES respectively); we make the usual assumption that the AES and Blowfish block ciphers are PRPs. We pad smaller values out to 64 bits, but for data that is longer than a single 128-bit AES block, the standard CBC mode of operation leaks prefix equality (e.g., if two data items have an identical prefix that is at least 128 bits long). To avoid this problem, we use AES with a variant of the CMC mode [24], which can be approximately thought of as one round of CBC, followed by another round of CBC with the blocks in the reverse order. Since the goal of DET is to reveal equality, we use a zero IV (or "tweak" [24]) for our AES-CMC implementation of DET.

Order-preserving encryption (OPE). OPE allows order relations between data items to be established based on their en-crypted values, without revealing the data itself. If x < y, then

 $\begin{array}{l} OPE_{\kappa}\left(x\right) < OPE_{\kappa}\left(y\right), \mbox{ for any secret key } \mathcal{K}.\\ \hline Therefore, \mbox{ if a column}\\ \mbox{given encrypted constants OPE (c) and OPE (c) corresponding to the range [kc, 1 c]. The k server can also perform ORDER BY1, MIN2, is encrypted with OPE, the server can perform range queries when MAX, SORT, etc. \end{array}$

OPE is a weaker encryption scheme than DET because it reveals order. Thus, the CryptDB proxy will only reveal OPE-encrypted columns to the server if users request order queries on those columns. OPE has provable security guarantees [4]: the encryption is equiva- lent to a random mapping that preserves order.

The scheme we use [4] is the first provably secure such scheme. Until CryptDB, there was no implementation nor any measure of the practicality of the scheme. The direct implementation of the scheme took 25 ms per encryption of a 32-bit integer on an Intel 2.8 GHz Q9550 processor. We improved the algorithm by using AVL binary search trees for batch encryption (e.g., database loads), reducing the cost of OPE encryption to 7 ms per encryption without affecting its security. We also implemented a hypergeometric sampler that lies at the core of OPE, porting a Fortran implementation from 1988 [25].

Homomorphic encryption (HOM). HOM is a secure probabilis- tic encryption scheme (IND-CPA secure), allowing the server to perform computations on encrypted data with the final result de- crypted at the proxy. While fully homomorphic encryption is pro-hibitively slow [10], homomorphic encryption for specific operations is efficient. To support summation, we implemented the Paillier cryptosystem [35]. With Paillier, multiplying the encryptions of HOM (*x*) HOM (*y*) = HOM (x + y), where the multiplication κ is skiw values κ results in an encryption of the sum of the values, i.e., performed \cdot modulo some public-key value. To compute SUM aggre-qates, the proxy replaces SUM with calls to a

UDF that performs Paillier multiplication on a column encrypted with HOM. HOM can also be used for computing averages by having the DBMS server return the sum and the count separately, and for incrementing values (e.g., SET id=id+1), on which we elaborate shortly.

With HOM, the ciphertext is 2048 bits. In theory, it should be possible to pack multiple

values from a single row into one HOM \times ciphertext for that row, using the scheme of Ge

and Zdonik [17], which would result in an amortized space overhead of 2 (e.g., a 32-bit value occupies 64 bits) for a table with many HOM-encrypted columns. However, we have not implemented this optimization in our prototype. This optimization would also complicate partial- row UPDATEoperations that reset some—but not all—of the values packed into a HOM ciphertext.

Join (JOIN and OPE-JOIN). A separate encryption scheme is necessary to allow equality joins between two columns, because we use different keys for DET to prevent crosscolumn correlations. JOIN also supports all operations allowed by DET, and also en- ables the server to determine repeating values between two columns. OPE-JOIN enables joins by order relations. We provide a new cryp- tographic scheme for JOIN and we discuss it in §3.4.




Figure 2: Onion encryption layers and the classes of computation they allow. Onion names stand for the operations they allow at some of their layers (Equality, Order, Search, and Addition). In practice, some onions or onion layers may be omitted, depending on column types or s-schema annotations provided by application developers (3.5.2). DET and JOIN are often merged into as single onion layer, sinces JOIN is a concatenation of DET and JOIN-ADJ (3.4). A random IV for RND (3.1), shared by the RND layers in *Eq* and *Ord*, is also stored for each data item.

Word search (SEARCH). SEARCH is used to perform searches on encrypted text to support operations such as MySQL's LIKEoper- ator. We implemented the cryptographic protocol of Song et al. [46], which was not previously implemented by the authors; we also use their protocol in a different way, which results in better security guarantees. For each column needing SEARCH, we split the text into keywords using standard delimiters (or using a special keyword extraction function specified by the schema developer). We then remove repetitions in these words, randomly permute the positions of the words, and then encrypt each of the words using Song et al.'s scheme, padding each word to the same size. SEARCH is nearly as secure as RND: the encryption does not reveal to the DBMS server whether a certain word repeats in multiple rows, but it leaks the number of keywords encrypted with SEARCH; an adversary may be able to estimate the number of distinct or duplicate words (e.g., by comparing the size of the SEARCH and RND ciphertexts for the same data).

When the user performs a query such as * SELECT FROM messages WHERE msg LIKE "% alice %", the proxy gives the DBMS server a token, which is an encryption of alice. The server cannot decrypt the token to figure out the underlying word. Using a user-defined function, the DBMS server checks if any of the word encryptions in any message match the token. In our approach, all the server learns from searching is whether a token matched a mes- sage or not, and this happens only for the tokens requested by the user. The server would learn the same information when returning the result set to the users, so the overall search scheme reveals the minimum amount of additional information needed to return the result.

Note that SEARCH allows CryptDB to only

perform full-word keyword searches; it cannot support arbitrary regular expressions. For applications that require searching for multiple adjacent words, CryptDB allows the application developer to disable duplicate re- moval and reordering by annotating the schema, even though this is not the default. Based on our trace evaluation, we find that most uses of LIKE can be supported by SEARCH with such schema an-notations. Of course, one can still combine multiple LIKEoperators with AND and OR to check whether multiple independent words are in the text.

A key part of CryptDB's design is *adjustable query-based encryp- tion*, which dynamically adjusts the layer of encryption on the DBMS server. Our goal is to use the most secure encryption schemes that enable running the requested queries. For example, if the application issues no queries that compare data items in a column, or that sort a column, the column should**S** be encrypted with RND. For columns that require equality checks but not

inequality checks, **e**DET suf- fices. However, the query set is not always known in

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that dynamically adjusts encryption strategies.

Our idea is to encrypt each data item in one or more *onions*: that is, each value is dressed in layers of increasingly stronger encryption, as

illustrated in Figures 2 and **L** 3. Each layer of each onion enables certain kinds of functionality as

explained in the previous **I** subsection. For example, outermost layers such as RND and HOM

provide maximum security, **C** whereas inner layers such as OPE provide more functionality.

Multiple onions are needed **I** in practice, both because the compu- tations supported by different encryption schemes **y** are not always strictly ordered, and because of performance

considerations (size of ciphertext **p** and encryption§ time for nested onion layers). Depending on the type of the data

(and any annotations provided by the appli- cation

developer on the database schema, as discussed in 3.5.2), CryptDB may not maintain all onions for each column. For instance, the *Search* onion does not make sense for

integers, and the *Add* onion does not make sense for strings.

For each layer of each \mathbf{n} onion, the proxy uses the same key for encrypting values in the same column, and different keys across tables, columns, onions, and onion layers. Using the same key for all values in a column allows the

proxy⁸ to perform operations on a column without having to compute separate keys for each row that will be manipulated. (We use finergrained encryption keys in 4 to reduce the potential amount of data disclosure in case of an application or proxy server compromise.) Using different keys across columns prevents the server from learning any additional relations. All of these keys are derived from the master key *MK*. For example, for table *t*, column *c*, onion *o*, and encryption layer *I*, the proxy uses the key $\frac{K_{tco,l} = PRP_{MK}}{(table t, column c, onion o, layer I), (1)}$ where PRP is a pseudorandom permutation (e.g., AES).

Each onion starts out encrypted with the most secure encryption scheme (RND for onions Eq and *Ord*, HOM for onion *Add*, and SEARCH for onion *Search*). As the proxy receives SQL queries from the application, it determines whether layers of encryption need to be removed. Given a predicate *P* on column *c* needed to execute a query on the server, the proxy first establishes what onion layer is needed to compute *P* on *c*. If

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the encryption of c is not already at an onion layer that allows P, the proxy strips off the onion layers to allow P on c, by sending the corresponding onion key to the server. The proxy never decrypts the data past the leastsecure encryption onion layer (or past some other threshold layer, if specified by the application developer in the schema, 3.5.1).

CryptDB implements onion layer decryption using UDFs that run on the DBMS server. For example, in Figure 3, to decrypt onion *Ord* of column 2 in table 1 to layer OPE, the proxy issues the following query to the server using the DECRYPT RNDUDF:

UPDATE Table1 SET

C2-Ord = DECRYPT RND(K, C2-Ord, C2-IV)

where *K* is the appropriate key computed from Equation (1). At the same time, the proxy updates its own internal state to remember that column *C2-Ord* in *Table1* is now at layer OPE in the DBMS. Each column decryption should be included in a transaction to avoid consistency problems with clients accessing columns being adjusted. Note that onion decryption is performed entirely by the DBMS server. In the steady state, no server-side decryptions are needed, because onion decryption happens only when a new class of com- putation is requested on a column. For example, after an equality

Employe	Table						
es ID	C1-IV C1-Eq C1-Ord C1-Add C1-Add C2-IV C2-Eq C2-Ord C2-Search						
Name	x27c3 x2b82 xcb94 xc2e4 x8a13 xd1e3 x7eb1						

Figure 3: Data layout at the server. When the application creates the table shown on the left, the table created at the DBMS server is the one shown on the right. Ciphertexts shown are not full-length.

check is requested on a column and the server brings the column to layer DET, the column

remains in that state, and future queries with § equality checks require no decryption. This property is the insight into why CryptDB's overhead is modest in the steady state (see 8): the server mostly performs typical SQL processing.

3.3

Table1 WHERE *C2-Eq* = xbb..4a, where xbb..4a is the *Eq* onion encryption of "Bob" using $K_{T1,C2,Eq,JOIN}$ and $K_{T1,C2,Eq,DET}$.

E x e c

Once the onion layers in the DBMS are at the layer necessary to execute **t** a query, the proxy

transforms the query to operate on these onions. In

particular, the proxy replaces column names in a query with corresponding onion names, based on

the class of computation **n** performed on that column. For example, for the schema shown in

Figure 3, a reference to the **S** Name column for an equality comparison will be replaced with a reference to the C2-Eq column.

The proxy also replaces each constant in the query

with a corre- sponding onion encryption of that constant, based on the compu- tation in which it is used. For instance, if a query contains WHERE Name =

'Alice', the proxy encrypts \mathbf{V} 'Alice' by successively applying all encryption layers corresponding to onion $Eq\mathbf{C}$ that have not yet been removed from C2-Eq.

Finally, the server replaces **I** certain operators with UDF-based counterparts. For instance, the SUM aggregate operator and the + column-addition operator must be replaced with an invocation of a UDF that

performs HOM **E**addition of ciphertexts. Equality and order operators (such as = and <) do not need such replacement and can be applied directly to the DET and OPE**n** ciphertexts.

Once the proxy has transformed the query, it

sends the query to the DBMS**C** server, receives query results (consisting of encrypted data),

decrypts the results using the corresponding onion keys, and sends the decrypted result to the application.

Read query execution. To understand query execution over ci- phertexts, consider the example schema shown in Figure 3. Initially, each column in the table is dressed in all onions of encryption, with RND, HOM, and SEARCH as outermost layers, as shown in Fig- ure 2. At this point, the server can learn nothing about the data other than the number of columns, rows, and data size.

To illustrate when onion layers are removed, consider the query:

SELECT ID FROM Employees WHERE Name = 'Alice',

which requires lowering the encryption of *Name* to layer DET. To execute this query, the proxy first issues the query

UPDATE Table1 SET

C2-Eq = DECRYPT RND(KT1,C2,Eq,RND, C2-Eq, C2-IV),

where column C2 corresponds to Name. The proxy then issues

SELECT C1-Eq, C1-IV FROM Table1 WHERE C2-Eq = x7..d,

where column *C1* corresponds to *ID*, and where x7..d is the *Eq* onion encryption of "Alice" with keys $K_{T1,C2,Eq,JOIN}$ and $K_{T1,C2,Eq,DET}$ (see Figure 2). Note that the proxy must request the random IV from column C1-IVin order to decrypt the RND ciphertext from C1-Eq. Finally, the proxy decrypts the results from the server using keys $K_{T1,C1,Eq,RND}$, $K_{T1,C1,Eq,RND}$, $K_{T1,C1,Eq,RND}$, $K_{T1,C1,Eq,RND}$, and $K_{T1,C1,Eq,RND}$, and $K_{T1,C1,Eq,RND}$, $K_{T1,C1,Eq,RND}$, $K_{T1,C1,Eq,RND}$, and returns it to the application.

If the next query is SELECT COUNT() FROM Employees WHERE Name = 'Bob', no server- side decryptions are necessary, and the proxy * directly issues the query SELECT COUNT() FROM Write query execution. To support INSERT, DELETE, and UPDATEqueries, the proxy applies the same processing to the predi- cates (i.e., the WHEREclause) as for read queries. DELETEqueries re- quire no additional processing. For all INSERT and UPDATEqueries that set the value of a column to a constant, the proxy encrypts each inserted column's value with each onion layer that has not yet been stripped off in that column.

The remaining case is an UPDATEthat sets a column value based on an existing column value, such as *salary=salary*+1. Such an update would have to be performed using HOM, to handle addi-tions. However, in doing so, the values in the OPE and DET onions would become stale. In fact, any hypothetical encryption scheme that simultaneously allows addition and direct comparison on the ciphertext is insecure: if a malicious server can compute the order of the items, and can increment the value by one, the server can repeatedly add one to each field homomorphically until it becomes equal to some other value in the same column. This would allow the server to compute the difference between any two values in the database, which is almost equivalent to knowing their values.

There are two approaches to allow updates based on existing column values. If a column is incremented and then only projected (no comparisons are performed on it), the solution is simple: when a query requests the value of this field, the proxy should request the HOM ciphertext from the Add onion, instead of ciphertexts from other onions, because the HOM value is up-to-date. For instance, this approach applies to increment gueries in TPC-C. If a column is used in comparisons after it is incremented, the solution is to replace the update query with two queries: a SELECT of the old values to be updated, which the proxy increments and encrypts accordingly, followed by an UPDATE setting the new values. This strategy would work well for updates that affect a small number of rows.

Other DBMS features. Most other DBMS mechanisms, such as transactions and indexing, work the same way with CryptDB over encrypted data as they do over plaintext, with no modifications. For transactions, the proxy passes along any BEGIN, COMMIT, and ABORT queries to the DBMS. Since many SQL operators behave differently on NULLs than on non-NULL values, CryptDB exposes NULL values to the DBMS without encryption. CryptDB does not currently support stored procedures, although certain stored procedures could be supported by rewriting their code in the same way that CryptDB's proxy rewrites SQL statements.

The DBMS builds indexes for encrypted data in

the same way as for plaintext. Currently, if the application requests an index on a column, the proxy asks the DBMS server to build indexes on that column's DET, JOIN, OPE, or OPE-JOIN onion layers (if they are exposed), but not for RND, HOM, or SEARCH. More efficient index selection algorithms could be investigated. equi-join is easy to support: CryptDB

3.4 **C** 0 m p u t n g 0 n S

There are two kinds of joins supported by CryptDB: *equi-joins*, in which the join predicate is based on equality, and *range joins*, which involve order checks. To perform an equi-join of two encrypted columns, the columns should be encrypted with the same key so that the server can see matching values between the two columns. At the same time, to provide better privacy, the DBMS server should not be able to join columns for which the application did not request a join, so columns that are never joined should not be encrypted with the same keys.

If the queries that can be issued, or the pairs of columns that can be joined, are known *a priori*,

can use the DET encryption scheme with the

same key for each group of columns[§] that are joined together. 3.5 describes how the proxy learns the columns to be joined in this case. However, the challenging case is when the proxy does not know the set of columns to be joined *a priori*, and hence does not know which columns

should be encrypted with matching keys. To solve this problem, we introduce a new cryptographic primi- tive, JOIN-ADJ (*adjustable join*), which allows the DBMS server to adjust the key of each column at runtime. Intuitively, JOIN-ADJ can be thought of as a keyed cryptographic hash with the additional prop- erty that hashes can be adjusted to change their key *without access to the plaintext*. JOIN-ADJ is a deterministic function of its input, which means that if two plaintexts are equal, the corresponding JOIN-ADJ values are also equal. JOIN-ADJ is collisionresistant, and has a sufficiently long output length (192 bits) to allow us to assume

that collisions never happen in practice. scheme as JOIN(v) = JOIN-ADJ(v) DET(v), where denotes con-catenation. This construction allows the proxy to decrypt a JOIN(v)JOIN-ADJ is non-invertible, so we define the JOIN encryption column to obtain v by decrypting// the DET// component, and allows the DBMS server to check two JOIN values for equality by compar- ing the JOIN-ADJ components.

Each column is initially encrypted at the JOIN layer using a different key, thus preventing any joins between columns. When a query requests a join, the proxy gives the DBMS server an onion key to adjust the JOIN-ADJ values in one of the two columns, so that it matches the JOIN-ADJ key of the other column (denoted the joinbase column). After the adjustment, the columns share the same JOIN-ADJ key, allowing the DBMS server to join them for equality. The DET components of JOIN remain encrypted with different keys. Note that our adjustable join is transitive: if the user joins columns A and B and then joins columns B and C, the server can join A and C. However, the server cannot join columns in different "transitivity groups". For instance, if columns D and E were joined together, the DBMS server would not be able to join columns A and D on its own. After an initial join query, the JOIN-ADJ values remain trans- formed with the same key, so no re-adjustments are needed for subsequent join queries between the same two columns. One ex- ception is if the application issues another query, joining one of the adjusted columns with a third column, which causes the proxy to re- adjust the column to another join-base. To avoid oscillations and to converge to a state where all columns in a transitivity group share the same join-base, CryptDB chooses the first column in lexicographic order on table and column name as the join-base. For *n* columns, the

overall maximum number of join transitions is n(n - 1)/2.

For range joins, a similar dynamic re-adjustment scheme is difficult to construct due to lack of structure in OPE schemes. Instead, CryptDB requires that pairs of columns that will be involved in such joins be declared by the application ahead of time, so that matching keys are used for layer OPE-JOIN of those columns; otherwise, the same key will be used for all columns at layer OPE-JOIN. Fortunately, range joins are rare; they are not used in any of our example applications, and are used in only 50 out of 128,840 columns in a large SQL query trace we describe in 8, corresponding to just three distinct applications.

tography (ECC). JOIN -ADJ κ (ν) is computed as **JOIN-ADJ** construction. Our algorithm uses elliptic-curve cryp-JOIN-ADJ κ (ν) := $P^{K \cdot \mathsf{PRF}_{\mathsf{K}_0}}(\nu)$, (2) where κ is the initial key for that table, column, onion, and layer, P is a point on an elliptic curve (being a public parameter), and PRF_{κ_0} is a pseudo-random function [20] mapping values to a pseudorandom

number, such as AES_{K_0} (SHA(*v*)), with K_0 being a

key that is the

same for all columns and derived from *MK*. The "exponentiation" is in fact repeated geometric addition of elliptic curve points; it is considerably faster than RSA exponentiation.

at the join I ye, the proxy computes $\Delta K = K/K_{J}$ the proxy computes $\Delta K = K/K_{J}$ and K_{J} DBMS server uses a UDF to adjust the key in *c* by computing:

 $(\text{JOIN-ADJ}\mathcal{K}_{J}(V))^{\Delta K} = P^{K^{J} \cdot \text{PRFKO}(V) \cdot (K/K^{J})}$

 $= P^{K \cdot PRF_{K0}(V)} = JOIN-ADJK(V).$ Now columns *c* and *c*⁷ share the same JOIN-ADJ key, and the DBMS

server can perform an equi-join on c and c_7 by taking the JOIN-ADJ component of the JOIN onion ciphertext.

At a high level, the security of this scheme is that the server cannot infer join relations among groups of columns that were not requested by legitimate join queries, and that the scheme does not reveal the plaintext. We proved the security of this scheme based on the standard Elliptic-Curve Decisional Diffie-Hellman hardness as- sumption, and implemented it using

a NIST-approved elliptic curve. We plan to publish a more detailed description of this algorithm and the proof on our web site [37].

Improving Security and Performance

Although CryptDB can operate with an unmodified and unannotated schema, as described above, its security and performance can be improved through several optional optimizations, as described below.

3.5.1

Minimum onion layers. Application developers can specify the lowest onion encryption layer that may be revealed to the server for a specific column. In this way, the developer can ensure that the proxy will not execute queries exposing sensitive relations to the server. For example, the developer could specify that credit card numbers should always remain at RND or DET.

In-proxy processing. Although CryptDB can evaluate a number of predicates on the server, evaluating them in the proxy can improve security by not revealing additional information to the server. One common use case is a SELECTquery that sorts on one of the selected columns, without a LIMITon the number of returned columns. Since the proxy receives the entire result set from the server, sorting these results in the proxy does not require a significant amount of compu- tation, and does not increase the bandwidth requirements. Doing so avoids revealing the OPE encryption of that column to the server.

Training mode. CryptDB provides a training mode, which allows a developer to provide a trace of queries and get the resulting onion encryption layers for each field, along with a warning in case§ some query is not supported. The developer can then examine thee resulting encryption levels to understand_c what each encryption scheme leaks, as described in 2.1. If

some onion level is too low for a sensitive field, she should arrange to have the *r* query processed

the data in some other fashion, such as by using a local instance of SQLite. t

Onion re-encryption. In cases when an application performs in- frequent queries requiring a low onion layer (e.g., OPE), CryptDB

could be extended to re-encrypt onions back to a higher layer after the infrequentm query finishes

attacks happening in the time window when the data is at the higher onion layer.

3.5.2

are not needed (e.g., discard the *Ord* onion for columns that are not used in range queries, or discard the *Search* onion for columns*e* where

layers that are not needed (e.g., the adjustable JOIN layer, if joins are known*fa priori*), or discard

the random IV needed for RND_O for some columns.

Ciphertext pre-computing and*r* **caching.** The proxy spends a sig- nificant amount of time encrypting values used in queries*m* with OPE and HOM. To reduce this cost, the proxy pre-computes (for HOM) and caches (for OPE)*a* encryptions of

Since HOM is probabilistic, ciphertexts cannot be reused. Therefore, in addition, *c* the proxy precomputes HOM's Pail- lier r^n randomness values for future encryptions of any data*e*. This optimization reduces the amount of CPU time spent by the proxy on OPE encryption, and

HOM pre-computation, it removes HOM

encryption from the critical path.

4 MULTIPLEt

PRINCIPALSi

We now extend the threat model to the case when the application infrastructure and proxy are also

untrusted (threat 2). This model is especially relevant for a multi-user web z site running a web

a

problems faced by a multi- user web application and CryptDB's solution to these problems,

consider phpBB, a popular online i web forum. In phpBB, each user has an account and a password, belongs to certain ogroups, and can send private messages to othern users. Depending on their groups' permissions, users can read entire

forums, only forum names, or not be able to read a forum at all.

There are several confidentiality guarantees that would be useful in phpBB. For example, we would like to ensure that a private message sent from one user to another is not visible to anyone else; that posts in a forum are accessible only to users in a group with access to that forum; and that the name of a forum is shown only to users belonging to a group that's allowed to view it. CryptDB provides these guarantees in the face of arbitrary compromises, thereby limiting the damage caused by a compromise.

Achieving these guarantees requires addressing two challenges. First, CryptDB must capture the application's access control policy for shared data at the level of SQL queries. To do this, CryptDB requires developers to annotate their database

Developer annotations. By default, CryptDB encrypts all fields and creates all applicable onions for each data item based on its type. If many columns are not sensitive, the developer can instead provide explicit annotations indicating the sensitive fields (as described in *§*4), *and* leave the remaining fields in plaintext.

Known query set. If the developer knows some of the queries ahead of time, as is the case for many web applications, the developer can use the training mode described above to adjust onions to the correct layer *a priori*, avoiding the overhead of runtime onion adjust- ments. If the developer provides the exact query set, or annotations that certain functionality is not needed on some columns, CryptDB can also discard onions that *§*

schema to specify principals and the data that each principal has access to, as described in 4.1.

The second challenge is to reduce the amount of information that an adversary can gain by compromising the system. Our solution limits the leakage resulting from a compromised application or proxy server to just the data accessible to users who were logged in during the compromise. In particular, the attacker cannot access the data of users that were not logged in during the compromise. Leaking the data of active users in case of a compromise is unavoidable: given the impracticality of arbitrary computation on encrypted data, some data for active users must be decrypted by the application.

In CryptDB, each user has a key (e.g., her application-level pass- word) that gives her access to her data. CryptDB encrypts different data items with different keys, and enforces the access control policy using chains of keys starting from user passwords and ending in the encryption keys of SQL data items, as described in 4.2. When a user logs in, she provides her password to the proxy (via the applica- tion). The proxy uses this password to derive onion keys to process gueries on encrypted data, as presented in the previous section, and to decrypt the results. The proxy can decrypt only the data that the user has access to, based on the access control policy. The proxy gives the decrypted data to the application, which can now compute on it. When the user logs out, the proxy deletes the user's kev.

4.1 Policy Annotations

To express the data privacy policy of a databasebacked application at the level of SQL queries. the application developer can annotate the schema of a database in CryptDB by specifying, for any subset of data items, which principal has access to it. A principal is an entity, such as a user or a group, over which it is natural to specify an access policy. Each SQL guery involving an annotated data item requires the privilege of the corresponding principal. CryptDB defines its own notion of principals instead of using existing DBMS principals for two reasons: first, many applications do not map application-level users to DBMS principals in a sufficiently fine-grained manner, and second, CryptDB requires explicit delegation of privileges between principals that is difficult to extract in an automated way from an access control list specification.

An application developer annotates the schema using the three steps described below and illustrated in Figure 4. In all examples we show, italics indicate table and column names, and bold text indicates annotations added for CryptDB.

Step 1. The developer must define the *principal types* (using PRINCTYPE) used in her application, such as users, groups, or mes- sages. A *principal*

is an instance of a principal type, e.g., principal 5 of type user. There are two classes of principals: external and internal. External principals correspond to end users who explicitly authenticate themselves to the application using a password. When a user logs into the application, the application must provide the user password to the proxy so that the user can get the privileges of her external principal. Privileges of other (internal) principals can be acquired only through delegation, as described in Step 3. When the user logs out, the application must inform the proxy, so that the proxy forgets the user's password as well as any keys derived from the user's password.

Step 2. The developer must specify which columns in her SQL schema contain sensitive data, along with the principals that should have access to that data, using the ENC FOR annotation. CryptDB requires that for each private data item in a row, the name of the principal that should have access to that data be stored in another column in the same row. For example, in Figure 4, the decryption of *msgtext* x37a21f is available only to principal 5 of type msg.

Step 3. Programmers can specify rules for how to delegate the privileges of one principal to other principals, using the speaks- for relation [49]. For example, in phpBB, a user should also have the privileges of the groups she belongs to. Since many applica- tions store such information in tables, programmers can specify to CryptDB how to infer delegation rules from rows in an existing table. In particular, programmers can annotate a table T with (a

x) SPEAKS FOR (by). This annotation indicates that each row

present in that table specifies that principal *a* of type x speaks for




Figure 4: Part of phpBB's schema with annotations to secure private messages. Only the sender and receiver may see the private message. An attacker that gains complete access to phpBB and the DBMS can access private messages of only currently active users.

principal b of type y, meaning that a has access to all keys that b has access to. Here, x and y must always be fixed principal types. Princi- pal b is always specified by the name of a column in table T . On the other hand, a can be either the name of another column in the same table, a constant, or T2.col, meaning all principals from column col of table T2. For example, in Figure 4, principal "Bob" of type physical user speaks for principal 2 of type user, and in Figure 6, all principalss in the contactId column from table PCMember (of type contact) speak for the *paperId* principal of type review. Optionally, the programmer can specify a predicate, whose inputs are values in the same row, to specify a condition under which delegation should occur, such as excluding conflicts in Figure 6. 5 provides more examples of using annotations to secure applications.

4.2 Key Chaining

Each principal (i.e., each instance of each principal type) is asso- ciated with a secret, randomly chosen key. If principal *B* speaks for principal *A* (as a res<u>u</u>lt of some SPEAKS FOR annotation), then principal *A*'s key is encrypted using principal *B*'s key, and stored as a row in the

special *access keys* table in the database. This allows principal *B* to gain access to principal *A*'s key. For example, in Figure 4, to give users 1 and 2 access to message 5, the key of msg 5 is encrypted with the key of user 1, and also separately encrypted with the key of user 2.

Each sensitive field is encrypted with the key of the principal in the ENC FORannotation. CryptDB encrypts the sensitive field with onions in the same way as for single-principal CryptDB, except that onion keys are derived from a principal's key as opposed to a global master key.

The key of each principal is a combination of a symmetric key and a public–private key pair. In the common case, CryptDB uses the symmetric key of a principal to encrypt any data and other principals' keys accessible to this principal, with little CPU cost. However, this is not always possible, if some principal is not currently online. For example, in Figure 4, suppose Bob sends message 5 to Alice, but Alice (user 1) is not online. This means that CryptDB does not have access to user 1's key, so it will not be able to encrypt message 5's key with user 1's symmetric key. In this case, CryptDB looks up the public key of the principal (i.e., user 1) in a second table, *public keys*, and encrypts message 5's key using user 1's public key. When user 1 logs in, she will be able to use the secret key part of her key to decrypt the key for message 5 (and re-encrypt it under her symmetric key for future use).

For external principals (i.e., physical users), CryptDB assigns a random key just as for any other principal. To give an external user access to the corresponding key on login, CryptDB stores the key of each external principal in a third table, *external keys*, encrypted with the principal's password. This allows CryptDB to obtain a user's key given the user's password, and also allows a user to change her password without changing the key of the principal.

When a table with a SPEAKS FOR relation is updated, CryptDB must update the *access keys* table accordingly. To insert a new row into *access keys* for a new SPEAKS FOR relation, the proxy must have access to the key of the principal whose privileges are being delegated. This means that an adversary that breaks into an application or proxy server cannot create new SPEAKS FORrelations for principals that are not logged in, because neither the proxy nor the adversary have access to their keys. If a SPEAKS FORrelation is removed, CryptDB revokes access by removing the corresponding row from *access keys*.

When encrypting data in a query or decrypting data from a result, CryptDB follows key chains starting from passwords of users logged in until it obtains the desired keys. As an optimization, when a user logs in, CryptDB's proxy loads the keys of some principals to which the user has access (in particular, those principal types that do not have too many principal instances—e.g., for groups the user is in, but not for messages the user received).

Applications inform CryptDB of users logging in or out by issuing INSERT and DELETESQL queries to a special table *cryptdb active* that has two columns, *username* and *password*. The proxy intercepts all queries for *cryptdb active*, stores the passwords of logged-in users in memory, and never reveals them to the DBMS server.

CryptDB guards the data of inactive users at the time of an attack. If a compromise occurs, CryptDB provides a bound on the data leaked,

allowing the administrators to not issue§ a blanket warning to *all* the users of the system. In this respect, CryptDB is different from other approaches to database security (see 9). However, some special users such as administrators with access to a large pool of data enable a larger compromise upon an attack. To avoid attacks happening when the administrator is logged in, the administrator should create a separate user account with restricted permissions when accessing the application as a regular user. Also, as good practice, an application should automatically log out users who have been inactive for some period of time.

5 APPLICATION CASE STUDIES

In this section, we explain how CryptDB can be used to secure three existing multi-user web applications. For brevity, we show simplified schemas, omitting irrelevant fields and type specifiers. Overall, we find that once a programmer specifies the principals in the application's schema, and the delegation rules for them us- ing SPEAKSFOR, protecting additional sensitive fields just requires additional ENC FOR annotations.

phpBB is a widely used open source-forum with a rich set of access control settings. Users are organized in groups; both users and groups have a variety of access permissions that the application

PRINCTYPE physica <u>l</u> user EXTERNAL; PRINCTYPE user, group, forum post, for <u>u</u> m name;	
CREATE TABLE users (userid int, username varchar(255), (username physical user) SPEAKS FOR (userid user));	
CREATE TABLE usergroup (userid int, groupid int,	
(<i>userid</i> user) SPEAKS FOR (<i>groupid</i> group));	
CREATE TABLE aclgroups (groupid int, forumid int, optionid int, (groupid group) SPEAKS FOR (forumid forum post) IF optionid=20, (groupid group) SPEAKS FOR (forumid forum_name) IF optionid=14);	
CREATE TABLE <i>posts</i> (<i>postid</i> int, <i>forumid</i> int,	
post text ENC FOR (forumid forum post));	-

Figure 5: Annotated schema for securing access to posts in phpBB. A user has access to see the content of posts in a forum if any of the groups that the user is part of has such permissions, indicated by *optionid* 20 in the *aclgroups* table for the corresponding *forumid* and *groupid*. Similarly, *optionid* 14 enables users to see the forum's name.

administrator can choose. We already showed

how to secure private messages between two users in phpBB in Figure 4. A more detailed case is securing access to posts, as shown in Figure 5. This example shows how to use predicates (e.g., IF *optionid*=...) to imple- ment a conditional speaks-for relation on principals, and also how one column (*forumid*) can be used to represent multiple principals (of different type) with different privileges. There are more ways to gain access to a post, but we omit them here for brevity.

HotCRP is a popular conference review application [27]. A key policy for HotCRP is that PC members cannot see who reviewed their own (or conflicted) papers. Figure 6 shows CryptDB annota- tions for HotCRP's schema to enforce this policy. Today, HotCRP cannot prevent a curious or careless PC chair from logging into the database server and seeing who wrote each review for a paper that she is in conflict with. As a result, conferences often set up a second server to review the chair's papers or use inconvenient out- of- band emails. With CryptDB, a PC chair cannot learn who wrote each review for her paper, even if she breaks into the application or database, since she does not have the decryption key.¹ The reason is that the SQL predicate "NoConflict" checks if a PC member is conflicted with a paper and prevents the proxy from providing access to the PC chair in the key chain. (We assume the PC chair does not modify the application to log the passwords of other PC members to subvert the system.)

grad-apply is a graduate admissions system used by MIT EECS. We annotated its schema to allow an applicant's folder to be accessed only by

PRINCTYPE physical user EXTERNAL; PRINCTYPE contact, review; CREATE TABLE ContactInfo (contactId int, email varchar($1\overline{2}0$), (email physical user) SPEAKS FOR (contactId contact)); CREATE TABLE PCMember (contactId int); CREATE TABLE PaperConflict (paperId int, contactId int); CREATE TABLE PaperReview (paperld int, reviewerld int ENC FOR (paperld review), commentsToPC text ENC FOR (paperid review), (PCMember.contactId contact) SPEAKS FOR (paperId review) IF NoConflict(paperId, contactId)

the respective applicant and any faculty us- ing (*reviewers.reviewer id* reviewer), meaning all reviewers, SPEAKS FOR (*candidate id* candidate) in table *candi- dates*, and ... SPEAKS FOR (*letter id* letter)in table *let- ters*. The applicant can see all of her folder data except for letters of recommendation. Overall, grad-apply has simple access control and therefore simple annotations.

¹Fully implementing this policy would require setting up two PC chairs: a main chair, and a backup chair responsible for reviews of the main chair's papers. HotCRP allows the PC chair to impersonate other PC members, so CryptDB annotations would be used to prevent the main chair from gaining access to keys of reviewers assigned to her paper. **Figure 6**: Annotated schema for securing reviews in HotCRP. Reviews and the identity of reviewers providing the review will be available only to PC members (table *PCMember* includes PC chairs) who are not conflicted, and PC chairs cannot override this restriction.

6 **DISCUSSION**

CryptDB's design supports most relational queries and aggregates on standard data types, such as integers and text/varchar types. Addi-tional operations can be added to CryptDB by extending its existing onions, or adding new onions for specific data types (e.g., spatial and multi-dimensional range queries [43]). Alternatively, in some cases, it may be possible to map complex unsupported operation to simpler ones (e.g., extracting the month out of an encrypted date is easier if the date's day, month, and year fields are encrypted separately).

There are certain computations CryptDB cannot support on en- crypted data. For example, it does not support both computation and comparison on the same column, such as WHERE salary > age 2+10. CryptDB can process a part of this query, but it would also require some processing on the proxy. In CryptDB, such a query should be (1) rewritten into a sub-query that selects a whole column, SELECT age 2+10 FROM . . ., which CryptDB computes using HOM, and (2) re-encrypted in the proxy, creating a new col- umn (call it aux) on the DBMS server consisting of the newly en- crypted values. Finally, the original query with the predicate WHERE salary > aux should be run. We have not been affected by this limitation in our test applications (TPC-C, phpBB, HotCRP, and grad-apply).

In multi-principal mode, CryptDB cannot perform server-side computations on values encrypted for different principals, even if the application has the authority of all principals in question, be- cause the ciphertexts are encrypted with different keys. For some computations, it may be practical for the proxy to perform the com- putation after decrypting the data, but for others (e.g., large-scale aggregates) this approach may be too expensive. A possible exten- sion to CryptDB to support such queries may be to maintain multiple ciphertexts for such values, encrypted under different keys.

7 IMPLEMENTATION

The CryptDB proxy consists of a C++ library and

a Lua module. The C++ library consists of a query parser; a query encryptor/rewriter, which encrypts fields or includes UDFs in the query; and a re-sult decryption module. To allow applications to transparently use CryptDB, we used MySQL proxy [47] and implemented a Lua mod- ule that passes queries and results to and from our C++ module. We implemented our new cryptographic protocols using NTL [44]. Our

*

	Databases	Tables	Columns
Complete schema	8,548	177,154	1,244,216
Used in query	1,193	18,162	128,840

Figure 7: Number of databases, tables, and columns on the sql.mit.edu MySQL server, used for trace analysis, indicating the total size of the schema, and the part of the schema seen in queries during the trace period.

CryptDB implementation consists~ of 18,000 lines ~ of C++ code and 150 lines ~of Lua code, with another 10,000 lines of test code. CryptDB is portable and we have implemented versions for both

Postgres 9.0 and MySQL 5.1. Our initial Postgresbased imple- mentation is described in an earlier technical report [39]. Porting CryptDB to MySQL required changing only 86 lines of code, mostly in the code for connecting to the MySQL server and declaring UDFs. As mentioned earlier, CryptDB does not change the DBMS; we implement all server-side functionality with UDFs and server-side tables. CryptDB's design, and to a large extent our implementation, should work on top of any SQL DBMS that supports UDFs.

8 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION

In this section, we evaluate four aspects of CryptDB: the difficulty of modifying an application to run on top of CryptDB, the types of queries and applications CryptDB is able to support, the level of security CryptDB provides, and the performance impact of using CryptDB. For this analysis, we use seven applications as well as a large trace of SQL queries.

We evaluate the effectiveness of our annotations and the needed application changes§ on the three applications we described in 5 (phpBB, HotCRP, and grad-apply), as well as on a TPC-C query mix (a standard workload in the database industry). We then analyze the functionality and security of CryptDB on three more applications, on TPC-C, and on a large trace of SQL queries. The additional three applications are OpenEMR, an electronic medical records applica - tion storing private medical data of patients; the web application of an MIT class (6.02), storing students' grades; and PHPcalendar, storing people's schedules. The large trace of SQL queries comes from a popular MySQL server at MIT, sql.mit.edu. This server is used primarily by web applications running on scripts.mit.edu, a shared web application hosting service operated by MIT's Student Information Processing Board (SIPB). In addition, this SQL server is used by a number of applications that run on other machines and use sql.mit.eduonly to store their data. Our query trace spans about ten

days, and includes approximately 126 million queries. Figure 7 summarizes the schema statistics for sql.mit.edu; each database is likely to be a separate instance of some application.

Finally, we evaluate the overall performance of CryptDB on the

phpBB application and on a query mix from TPC-C, and perform a detailed analysis through microbenchmarks.

In the six applications (not counting TPC-C), we only encrypt sen- sitive columns, according to a manual inspection. Some fields were clearly sensitive (e.g., grades, private message, medical information), but others were only marginally so (e.g., the time when a message was posted). There was no clear threshold between sensitive or not, but it was clear to us which fields were definitely sensitive. In the case of TPC-C, we encrypt all the columns in the database in singleprincipal mode so that we can study the performance and functionality of a fully encrypted DBMS. All fields are considered for encryption in the large query trace as well.

8.1 Application Changes

Figure 8 summarizes the amount of programmer effort required to use CryptDB in three multiuser web applications and in the singleprincipal TPC-C queries. The results show that, for multi-principal mode, CryptDB required between 11 and 13 unique schema annotations (29 to 111 in total), and 2 to 7 lines of code changes to provide user passwords to the proxy, in order to secure sensitive information stored in the database. Part of the simplicity is because securing an additional column requires just one annotation in most cases. For the single-principal TPC-C queries, using CryptDB required no application annotations at all.

8.2 Functional Evaluation

To evaluate what columns, operations, and queries CryptDB can support, we analyzed the queries issued by six web applications (including the three applications we analyzed in 8.1), the TPC-C queries, and the SQL queries from sql.mit.edu. The results are shown in the left half of Figure 9.

CryptDB supports most queries; the number of columns in the "needs plaintext" column, which counts columns that cannot be processed in encrypted form by CryptDB, is small relative to the total number of columns. For PHP-calendar and OpenEMR, CryptDB does not support queries on certain sensitive fields that perform string manipulation (e.g., substring and lowercase conversions) or date manipulation (e.g., obtaining the day, month, or year of an encrypted date). However, if these functions were precomputed with the result added as standalone columns (e.g., each of the three parts of a date were encrypted separately), CryptDB would support these queries.

The next two columns, "needs HOM" and "needs SEARCH", reflect the number of columns for which that encryption scheme is needed to process some queries. The numbers suggest that these encryption schemes are important; without these schemes, CryptDB would be unable to support those queries.

Based on an analysis of the larger sql.mit.edu trace, we found that CryptDB should be able to support operations over all but 1,094 of the 128,840 columns observed in the trace. The "inproxy processing" shows analysis results where we assumed the proxy can perform some lightweight operations on the results returned from the DBMS server. Specifically, this included any operations that are not needed to compute the set of resulting rows or to aggregate rows (that is, expressions that do not appear in a WHERE, HAVING, or GROUP BY clause, or in an ORDER BY clause with a LIMIT, and are not aggregate operators). With in-proxy processing, CryptDB should be able to process queries over encrypted data over all but 571 of the 128,840 columns, thus supporting 99.5% of the columns.

Of those 571 columns, 222 use a bitwise operator in a WHERE

clause or perform bitwise aggregation, such as the Gallery2 applica- tion, which uses a bitmask of permission fields and consults them in WHERE clauses. Rewriting the application to store the permissions in a different way would allow CryptDB to support such opera- tions. Another 205 columns perform string processing in the WHERE clause, such as comparing whether lowercase versions of two strings match. Storing a keved hash of the lowercase version of each string for such columns, similar to the JOIN-ADJ scheme, could support case-insensitives equality checks for ciphertexts. 76 columns are involved in mathematical transformations in the WHERE clause, such as manipulating dates, times, scores, and geometric coordinates. 41 columns invoke the LIKE operator with a column reference for the pattern; this is typically used to check a particular value against a table storing a list of banned IP addresses, usernames, URLs, etc. Such a guery can also be rewritten if the data items are sensitive.

8.3 Security Evaluation

To understand the amount of information that would be revealed to the adversary in practice, we examine the steady-state onion levels of different columns for a range of applications and queries. To

Applicatio	Annotations Log	in/logout cod	de Sensitive fields secured, and examples of such fields
n phpBB	31 (11 unique)	7 lines	23: private messages (content, subject), posts,
HotCRP	forums		
grad-apply	29 (12 unique)	2 lines	22: paper content and paper information, reviews
TPC-C (single	111 (13 uniqué)	2 lines	103: student grades (61), scores (17),
princ.)	recommendations, revie	ews	
	0	0	92: all the fields in all the tables encrypted

Figure 8: Number of annotations the programmer needs to add to secure sensitive fields, lines of code to be added to provide CryptDB with the passwords of users, and the number of sensitive fields that CryptDB secures with these annotations, for three different applications. We count as one annotation each invocation of our three types of annotations and any SQL predicate used in a SPEAKS FOR annotation. Since multiple fields in the same table are usually encrypted for the same principal (e.g., message subject and content), we also report unique annotations.

Application	Total cols.	Consider for enc.	Needs plaintext	Needs HOM	Needs SEARCH		aintext cols.	with		Most sensitive
						RND	SEARCH	DET	OPE	cols. at HIGH
phpBB	563	23	0	1	0	21	0	1	1	6/6
HotCRP	204	22	0	2	1	18	1	1	2	18/18
grad-apply	706	103	0	0	2	95	0	6	2	94/94
OpenEMR	1, 297	566	7	0	3	526	2	12	19	525 /
										540
MIT 6.02	15	13	0	0	0	7	0	4	2	1/1
PHP-calendar	25	12	2	0	2	3	2	4	1	3/4
TPC-C	92	92	0	8	0	65	0	19	8	_
Trace from sql.mit.edu	128,	128, 840	1,094	1,019	1, 125	80, 053	350	34,	13,	—
with in-proxy	840 128,	128, 840	571	1,016	1, 135	84, 008	398	212 35,	131 8, 513	_
processing	840							350		
col. name contains	2,029	2, 029	2	0	0	1, 936	0	91	0	_
pass										
col. name contains content	2, 521	2, 521	0	0	52	2, 215	52	251	3	—
col. name contains priv	173	173	0	4	0	159	0	12	2	—

Figure 9: Steady-state onion levels for database columns required by a range of applications and traces. "Needs plaintext" indicates that CryptDB cannot execute the application's queries over encrypted data for that column. For the applications in the top gr oup of rows, sensitive columns were determined manually, and only these columns were considered for encryption. For the bottom group of rows, all database columns were automatically considered for encryption. The rightmost column considers the application's most sensitive database columns, and reports the number of them that have MinEnc in HIGH (both terms are defined in §8.3).

quantify the level of security, we define the MinEnc of a column to be the weakest onion encryption scheme exposed on any of the onions of a column when onions reach a steady state (i.e., after the application generates all query types, or after running the whole trace). We consider RND and HOM to be the strongest schemes, followed by SEARCH, followed by DET and JOIN, and finishing with the weakest scheme which is OPE. For example, if a column has onion *Eq* at RND, onion *Ord* at OPE and onion *Add* at HOM, the MinEnc of this column is OPE.

The right side of Figure 9 shows the MinEnc onion level for a range of applications and query traces. We see that most fields remain at RND, which is the most secure scheme. For example, OpenEMR has hundreds of sensitive fields describing the medical conditions and history of patients, but these fields are mostly just inserted and fetched, and are not used in any computation. A num- ber of fields also remain at DET, typically to perform key lookups and joins. case DET is logically equivalent to RND). These are highly secure encryption schemes leaking virtually nothing about the data. DET for columns with repeats and OPE are not part of HIGH as they reveal relations to the DBMS server. The

OPE, which leaks order, is used the least

sensitive (e.g., timestamps and counts of

confidentiality over revealing all encryption

To analyze CryptDB's security for specific

a new security level, HIGH, which includes the

RND and HOM encryption schemes, as well as

DET for columns having no repetitions (in which

columns that are par- ticularly sensitive, we define

pro-vides a significant improvement in

schemes to the server.

frequently, and mostly for fields that are marginally

messages). Thus, CryptDB's adjustable security

they reveal relations to the DBMS server. The rightmost column in Figure 9 shows that most of the particularly sensitive columns (again, according to manual inspection) are at HIGH.

For the sql.mit.edu trace queries, approximately 6.6% of columns were at OPE even with in-proxy processing; other en- crypted columns (93%)

remain at DET or above. Out of the columns that were at OPE, 3.9% are used in an ORDER BY clause with a

LIMIT, 3.7% are used in an inequality comparison in a WHEREclause, and 0.25% are used in a MINor MAXaggregate operator (some of the columns are counted in more than one of these groups). It would be difficult to perform these computations in the proxy without substantially increasing the amount of data sent to it.

Although we could not examine the schemas of applications us- ing sql.mit.edu to determine what fields are sensitive—mostly due to its large scale—we measured the same statistics as above for columns whose names are indicative of sensitive data. In particular, the last three rows of Figure 9 show columns whose name contains the word "pass" (which are almost all some type of password), "con- tent" (which are typically bulk data managed by an application), and "priv" (which are typically some type of private message). CryptDB reveals much less information about these columns than an average column, almost all of them are supported, and almost all are at RND or DET.

Finally, we empirically validated CryptDB's confidentiality guar- antees by trying real attacks on phpBB that have been listed in the CVE database [32], including two SQL injection attacks (CVE-2009- 3052 & CVE-2008-6314), bugs in permission checks (CVE-2010- 1627 & CVE-2008-7143), and a bug in remote PHP file inclusion (CVE-2008-6377). We found that, for users not currently logged in, the answers returned from the DBMS were encrypted; even with root access to the application server, proxy, and DBMS, the answers were not decryptable.

8.4 Performance Evaluation

To evaluate the performance of CryptDB, we used a machine with two 2.4 GHz Intel Xeon E5620 4-core processors and 12 GB of RAM to run the MySQL 5.1.54 server, and a machine with eight 2.4 GHz AMD Opteron 8431 6-core processors and 64 GB of RAM to run the CryptDB proxy and the clients. The two machines were connected over a shared Gigabit Ethernet network. The higher-provisioned client machine ensures that the clients are not the bottleneck in any experiment. All workloads fit in the server's RAM.




Figure 10: Throughput for TPC-C queries, for a varying number of cores on the underlying MySQL DBMS server.




Figure 11: Throughput of different types of SQL queries from the TPC- C query mix running under MySQL, CryptDB, and the strawman design. "Upd. inc" stands for UPDATE that increments a column, and "Upd. set" stands for UPDATE which sets columns to a constant.

8.4.1 TPC

-C

We compare the performance of a TPC-C query mix when running on an unmodified MySQL server versus on a CryptDB proxy in front of the§ MySQL server. We trained CryptDB on the query set (3.5.2) so there are no onion adjustments during the TPC-C experiments. Figure 10 shows the throughput of TPC-C queries as the number of cores on the server varies from one to eight. In all cases, the server spends 100% of its CPU time processing queries. Both MySQL and CryptDB scale well initially, but start to level off due to internal lock contention in the MySQL server, as reported by SHOW STATUS LIKE 'Table%'. The overall throughput with CryptDB is 21 –26% lower than MySQL, depending on the exact number of cores.

To understand the sources of CryptDB's overhead, we measure the server throughput for different types of SQL queries seen in TPC-C, on the same server, but running with only one core enabled. Figure 11 shows the results for MySQL, CryptDB, and a *strawman* design; the strawman performs each query over data encrypted with RND by decrypting the relevant data using a UDF, performing the query over × the plaintext, and

×

Query (&	MySQL Server		CryptDB	I
scheme)	Server	Serve r	Proxy	Proxy×
Select by = (DET)	0.10 ms	0.11 ms	0.86	0.86
Select join (JOIN)	0.10 ms	0.11 ms	ms	ms
Select range	0.16 ms	0.22 ms	0.75	0.75
(OPE) Select sum	0.11 ms	0.46 ms	ms	ms
(HOM) Delete	0.07 ms	0.08 ms	0.78	28.7
Însert (all)	0.08 ms	0.10 ms	ms	ms
Figure 12: Server and p	roxy latency	for 0.14 ms	different	ypes of SQL
queries from TPC-C. For	eachinguery			we show the
predominant(HOM) encryption	scheme	used at	the0.28ser	ver. 0Due.28 to

details of the TPC-C workload, each query type affects a different number of rows, and involves a different re-encrypting the result (if updating rows). The results show that CryptDB's throughput penalty is great- est for queries that involve a SUM (2.0 less throughput) and for incrementing UPDATE statements (1.6 less throughput); these are the queries that involve HOM additions at the server. For the other types of queries, which form a larger part of the TPC-C mix, the throughput overhead is modest. The strawman design performs poorly for almost all queries because the DBMS's indexes on the number of cryptographic operations. The left two columns correspond to server throughput, which is also shown in Figure 11. "Proxy" shows the latency added by CryptDB's proxy; "Proxy*x*" shows the proxy latency without the ciphertext precomputing and caching optimization (3.5). Bold numbers show where pre-computing and caching ciphertexts helps. The "Overall" row is the average latency over the mix of TPC-C queries. "Update set" is an UPDATE where the fields are set to a constant, and "Update inc" is an UPDATE where some fields are incremented.

Scheme	Encr		Dec	rypt	Special operation	
Blowfish (1 int.)	0.000	1 ms		0001	_	
			n	าร		
AES-CBC (1 KB)	0.008	3 ms	0.007 ms		—	
AES-CMC (1 KB)	0.016	016 ms 0.015 ms		—		
OPE (1 int.)	9.0	ms	9.0	ms	Compare: 0	ms
SEARCH (1 word)	0.01	ms	0.004	1 ms	Match: 0.00)1 ms
HOM (1 int.)	9.7 ms		0.7 ms		Add: 0.00)5 ms
JOIN-ADJ (1 int.)	0.52 ms		ms —		Adjust: 0.5	56 ms

Figure 13: Microbenchmarks of cryptographic schemes, per unit of data encrypted (one 32-bit integer, 1 KB, or one 15-byte word of text), measured by taking the average time over many iterations.

RND-encrypted data are useless for operations on the underlying plaintext data. It is pleasantly surprising that the higher security of CryptDB over the strawman also brings better performance.


To understand the latency introduced by CryptDB's proxy, we measure the server and proxy processing times for the same types of SQL queries as above. Figure 12 shows the results. We can see that there is an overall server latency increase of 20% with CryptDB, which we consider modest. The proxy adds an average of 0.60 ms to a query; of that time, 24% is spent in MySQL proxy, 23% is spent in encryption and decryption, and the remaining 53% is spent parsing and processing queries. § The cryptographic overhead is relatively small

because most of our encryption schemes are efficient; Figure 13 shows their performance. OPE and HOM are the slowest, but the ciphertext pre-computing and caching optimization (3.5) masks the high latency of queries requiring OPE and HOM. Proxyx in Figure 12 shows the latency without these optimizations, which is significantly higher for the corresponding query types. SELECT queries that involve a SUM use HOM but do not benefit from this optimization, because the proxy performs decryption, rather than encryption.

In all TPC-C experiments, the proxy used less than 20 MB of memory. Caching ciphertexts for the 30, 000 most common values for OPE accounts for about 3 MB, and pre-computing ciphertexts and randomness for 30,000 values at HOM required 10 MB. i-User Web Applic ations

To evaluate the impact of CryptDB on application performance, we measure the throughput of phpBB for a workload with 10 parallel clients, which ensured 100% CPU load at the server. Each client continuously issued HTTP requests to browse the forum, write and

8.4.2 *Mult*



MvSQL	MySQL+proxy	CryptDB
	IVIYOQLTPIOXY	CIYPIDD

Figure 14: Throughput comparison for phpBB. "MySQL" denotes phpBB running directly on MySQL. "MySQL+proxy" denotes phpBB running on an unencrypted MySQL database but going through MySQL proxy. "CryptDB" denotes phpBB running on CryptDB with notably sensitive fields annotated and the database appropriately encrypted. Most HTTP requests involved tens of SQL queries each. Percentages indicate throughput

tens of SQL queries each. Percentages indicate throughput reduction relative to MySQL.

			W post		
MySQL	60 ms	50 ms	133 ms	61 ms	237 ms
CryptDB	67 ms	60 ms	151 ms	73 ms	251 ms

Figure 15: Latency for HTTP requests that heavily use encrypted fields in phpBB for MySQL and CryptDB. R and W stand for

х

read posts, as well as write and read private messages. We pre-loaded forums and user mailboxes with messages. In this experiment, we co-located the MySQL DBMS, the CryptDB proxy, and the web application server on a single-core machine, to ensure we do not add additional resources for a separate proxy server machine to the system in the CryptDB configuration. In practice, an administrator would likely run the CryptDB proxy on another machine for security. Figure 14 shows the throughput of phpBB in three different con- figurations: (1) connecting to a stock MySQL server, (2) connecting to a stock MySQL server through MySQL proxy, and (3) connecting to CryptDB, with notably sensitive fields encrypted as summarized in Figure 9, which in turn uses a stock MySQL server to store encrypted data. The results show that phpBB incurs an overall throughput loss of just 14.5%, and that about half of this loss comes from inefficiencies in MySQL proxy unrelated to CryptDB. Fig- ure 15 further shows the end-to-end latency for five types of phpBB requests. The results show that CryptDB adds 7-18 ms (6-20%) of processing time per request.

secure onion layers, such as RND, is fast, and needs to be performed

only once per column for the lifetime of the system.² Removing a layer of RND requires AES decryption, which our experimental machine can perform at 200 MB/s per core. Thus, removing an onion layer is bottlenecked by the speed at which the [~]DBMS server can copy a column from disk for disk-bound databases.

9 RELATED WORK

Search and queries over encrypted data. Song et al. [46] describe cryptographic tools for performing keyword search over encrypted data, which we use to implement SEARCH. Amanatidis et al. [2]

8.4.3 Stora

ge

CryptDB increases the amount of the data stored in the DBMS, because it stores multiple onions for the same field, and because ciphertexts are larger than plaintexts for some encryption schemes. For TPC-C, CryptDB increased the database size by 3.76, mostly due to cryptographic expansion of integer fields encrypted with HOM (which expand from 32 bits to 2048 bits); strings and binary data remains roughly the same size. For phpBB, the database size using an unencrypted system was 2.6 MB for a workload of about 1,000 private messages and 1,000 forum posts generated by 10 users. The same workload on CryptDB had a database of 3.3 MB, about 1.2 larger. Of the 0.7 MB increase, 230 KB is for storage of access keys, 276 KB is for public keys and external keys, and 166 KB is due to expansion of encrypted fields.

> 8.4.4 Adjus table Encry ption

propose methods for exact searches that do not require scanning the entire database and could be used to process certain restricted SQL queries. Bao et al. [3] extend these encrypted search methods to the multi-user case. Yang et al. [51] run selections with equality predicates over encrypted data. Evdokimov and Guenther present methods for the same selections, as well as Cartesian products and projections [15]. Agrawal et al. develop a statistical encoding that preserves the order of numerical data in a column [1], but it does not have sound cryptographic properties, unlike the scheme we use [4]. Boneh and Waters show public-key schemes for comparisons, subset checks, and conjunctions of such queries over encrypted data [5], but these schemes have ciphertext lengths that are exponential applications to work with SPORC or Depot. Many in the length of the plaintext, limiting their practical applicability.

When applied to processing SQL on encrypted data, these tech- niques suffer from some of the following limitations: certain basic queries are not supported or are too inefficient (especially joins and order checks), they require significant client-side query processing, users either have to build and maintain indexes on the data at the server or to perform sequential scans for every selection/search, and implementing these techniques requires unattractive changes to the innards these tokens using an order-preserving encryption of the DBMS.

Some researchers have developed prototype systems for subsets of SQL, but they provide no confidentiality guarantees, require a significant DBMS for the necessary classes of computation to the rewrite, and rely on client-side processing [9, 12, 22]. For example, Hacigumus et al. [22] heuristically split the domain of possible values

Adjustable query-based encryption involves decrypting columns to

lower-security onion levels. Fortunately, decryption for the moredata/columns.

for each column into partitions, storing the partition number unencrypted for each data item, and rely on extensive client-side filtering of query results. Chow et al. [8] require trusted entities and two non-colluding untrusted DBMSes.

Untrusted servers. SUNDR [28] uses cryptography to provide privacy and integrity in a file system on top of an untrusted file server. Using a SUNDR-like model, SPORC [16] and Depot [30] show how to build low-latency applications, running mostly on the clients, without having to trust a server. However, existing server-side appli-cations that involve separate database and application servers cannot be used with these systems unless they are rewritten as distributed client-side appli- cations are not amenable to such a structure.

Companies like Navajo Systems and Ciphercloud provide a trusted application-level proxy that intercepts network traffic be- tween clients and cloud-hosted servers (e.g., IMAP), and encrypts sensitive data stored on the server. These products appear to break up sensitive data (specified by application-specific rules) into tokens (such as words in a string), and encrypt each of scheme, which allows token-level searching and sorting. In contrast, CryptDB supports a richer set of operations (most of SQL), reveals only relations server based on the gueries issued by the application, and allows chaining of encryption keys to user passwords, to restrict data leaks from a compromised proxy.

²Unless the administrator periodically re-encrypts

Disk encryption. Various commercial database products, such as Oracle's Transparent Data Encryption [34], encrypt data on disk, but decrypt it to perform query processing. As a result, the server must have access to decryption keys, and an adversary compromising the DBMS software can gain access to the entire data.

Software security. Many tools help programmers either find or mitigate mistakes in their code that may lead to vulnerabilities. including static analysis tools like PQL [29, 31] and UrFlow [7], and runtime tools like Resin [52] and CLAMP [36]. In contrast, CryptDB provides confidentiality guarantees for user data even if the adversary gains complete control over the application and database servers. These tools provide no guarantees in the face of this threat, but in contrast, CryptDB cannot provide confidentiality in the face of vulnerabilities that trick the user's client machine into issuing unwanted requests (such as cross-site scripting or cross-site request forgery vulnerabilities in web applications). As a result, using CryptDB together with these tools should improve overall application security.

Rizvi et al. [41] and Chlipala [7] specify and enforce an applica- tion's security policy over SQL views. CryptDB's SQL annotations can capture most of these policies, except for result processing being done in the policy's view, such as allowing a user to view only aggregates of certain data. Unlike prior systems, CryptDB enforces SQL-level policies cryptographically, without relying on compile-time or run-time permission checks.

Privacy-preserving aggregates. Privacypreserving data inte- gration, mining, and aggregation schemes are useful [26, 50], but are not usable by many applications because they support only spe- cialized query types and require a rewrite of the DBMS. Differential privacy [14] is complementary to CryptDB; it allows a trusted server to decide what answers to release and how to obfuscate answers to aggregation queries to avoid leaking information about any specific record in the database.

Query integrity. Techniques for SQL query integrity can be integrated into CryptDB because CryptDB allows relational queries on encrypted data to be processed just like on plaintext. These methods can provide integrity by adding a MAC to each tuple [28, 42], freshness using hash chains [38, 42], and both freshness and completeness of query results [33]. In addition, the client can verify the results of aggregation queries [48], and provide query assurance for most read queries [45].

Outsourced databases. Curino et al. advocate the idea of a relational cloud [11], a context in which CryptDB fits well.

10 CONCLUSION

We presented CryptDB, a system that provides a practical and strong level of confidentiality in the face of two significant threats con- fronting database-backed applications: curious DBAs and arbitrary compromises of the application server and the DBMS. CryptDB meets its goals using three ideas: running queries efficiently over encrypted data using a novel SQL-aware encryption strategy, dy- namically adjusting the encryption level using onions of encryption to minimize the information revealed to the untrusted DBMS server, and chaining encryption keys to user passwords in a way that allows only authorized users to gain access to encrypted data.

Our evaluation on a large trace of 126 million SQL queries from a production MySQL server shows that CryptDB can support opera- tions over encrypted data for 99.5% of the 128,840 columns seen in the trace. The throughput penalty of CryptDB is modest, resulting in a reduction of 14.5–26% on two applications as compared to unmod- ified MySQL. Our security analysis shows that CryptDB protects most sensitive fields with highly secure encryption schemes for six applications. The developer effort consists of 11– 13 unique schema annotations and 2–7 lines of source code changes to express relevant privacy policies for 22–103 sensitive fields in three multi-user web applications.

The source code for our implementation is available for download at http://css.csail.mit.edu/cryptdb/.

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